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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Chief J'ltstice and Associate Justices of the 
S·upreme Court of Appeals of Vi.rginia: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Your petitioner, J. H. White, respectfully represents unto 
your Honors that he is aggrieved by the final judgment of the 
Circuit Court of Culpeper County, entered ~£arch 8th, 1938, 
on an appeal thereto from a prior judgment of the Trial Jus-
tice of Culpeper County, convicting him of the violation of a 
toWn ordinance, declaring it to be a nuisance, __ punishable as a 
misdemeanor for ''solicitors, itine'ra1?Jt · merchants, and tran-
sient vendors of merchandise'' to be in and upon priva.te 
residences within the said to\vn "not having been requested 
or invited so to do by the owner or owners, or occupant or 
occupants 9f said private residences, for the purpose of 
soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, 
or ·for the purpose of disposing of the same'' and fining him 
$25.00 and costs for such violation. _ 
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The appeal was heard de novo before the Judge without 
the intervention of a jury, on an agreed statement of facts. 
It resulted in the judgment aforesaid. 
A transcript of the record of said judgment is herewith 
presented and asked to be read as a part of this petition, from 
which the follo,ving facts 'vill appear: 
F.A!CTS OF THE CASE. 
(Note: Whenever in this petition italics appear they are 
supplied by the writer unless otherwise stated.) 
A jury was. waived and no evidence whatever was introduced 
at the trial except the agreed statement of facts (Tr., p .... ~). 
The essentials of this are as follows : · 
1. The Real Silk Hosiery :Mills, Inc., is an Illinois corpora-
tion, with mills and executive offices located in the City of 
Indianapolis, Indiana, engaged in the manufacture and sale, 
in interstate comn1erce, of hosiery, lingerie, and similar mer-
chandise. Your petitioner is employed as a solicitor for such 
sales by The Real Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., to individual con-
sumers. 
2. He carried no stock of merchandise but only samples 
which he displayed to customers. If a customer desired to 
purchase he sig11ed an order blank, addressed to the Real 
Silk Hosiery Mills, giving his name and address, stating the 
merchandise desired, the price and terms, which is sent to 
the JYiills at Indianapolis for its acceptance. If approved the 
order is filled by the merchandise being sent direct from the 
Mills to the customer, parcel post c. o. d. If the order is not 
approved the down payment is returned to the customer. 
3. The petitioner called "upon listed customers of said 
Mills in the Town of Culpeper, where such orders have been 
solicited for more than the past fifteen years", and "as he 
hears of new customers likely to be interested he calls upon 
them also''. 
4. ''At times in approaching a customer, or prospective 
purchaser 'at their private home' he 'would ask permission to 
call later and present a small token or gift'. 'If permission 
was given he would later that day or probably the next day 
'call and solicit the order'. 'In some instances * ., * especially 
as to old customers' he would state his business and solicit 
an order". He was "at all times courteous, gentlemanly and 
considerate in all of his calls & • *was never offensive or un-
duly insistent, nor 'vere any of his acts or practices da;ngerous, 
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offensive, unhealthy or unsafe; either as relating to the gen-
eral public or the person or persons upon whom the defendant 
called.'' 
5. On April 13th, 1937, the Town Council enacted the or-
dinance, effective April 27th, 1937, as follows: 
''Section No. 1. The practice of being in and upon private 
residences in the Town of Culpeper, Virginia, by solicitors, 
itinerant merchants, and transient vendors of merchandise 
not having been requested or invited so to· do by the owner or 
owners, or occupant or occupants of said private residences, 
for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, 
wares and merchandise or for the purpose of disposing of 
same, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and punishable as 
such nuisance as a misdemeanor. 
''Section 2. The police officers of the town of Culpeper 
are hereby required and directed to suppress the same and to 
abate any such nuisance as is described in the first section Qf 
this ordinance. 
''Section 3. Any person convicted of perpetrating a · nui-
sance as described and prohibited in the first Section of thiE? 
ordinance, upon conviction thereof shall be fined a sum not 
less than Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) or more than One 
Hundred Dollars ($100.00) tog·ether with costs." 
6. On June 23rd, 1937, your petitioner, as such a solicitor 
was calling upon his customers and prospective customers 
''in the manner as outlined in Section 4" of the stipulation, '. 
after which and upon the order of 4!1 • * the Mayor of the Town 
of Culpeper to a policeman of the town, a warrant was issued 
on the complaint of said policeman, charging that the peti-
tioner ''in the said town did on the 23rd clay of June, 1937, 
unlawf~'lly solicit orders for merchandise in private residences 
in the town of Culpeper contrary to the ordinance of the town 
of Culpeper'', and directing the arrest and production bef~re 
the Trial Justice of the petitioner. Your petitioner was found 
guilty of the charge set forth and fined $25.00 and costs. An 
appeal therefrom was properly perfected to the Circuit Court 
and brought to trial before the Judge of said court without 
the intervention of a jury, and without charge except as set 
out in the warrant and without evidence o"f any offence what-
soever, except as set out in the agreed statement of facts, 
with the result aforesaid: the imposition of a fine of $25.00 
against your petitioner. To this action and judgment of the 
court exceptions were duly ~aken (Rec., page 69). . 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
·The 1Court erred in finding that said ordinance had been 
violated; that any offense punishable thereunder had been 
committed and in imposing said fine and the grounds· follow-
ing were and are assigned : 
FIRST. 
The judgment of conviction 'vas contrary to the law and 
the evidence and unsupported by the evidence. 
SECOND. 
The town of Culpeper, Virginia, is without authority to 
enact or enforce the ordinance in question as construed. 
THIRD. 
The ordinance in question as construed and enforced 'vas 
an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the powers granted 
to it. 
FOURTH. 
The ordinance as construed and enforced arbitrarilv and 
Without due process of la'v deprived petitioner and sl':tndry 
property holders of their liberties, property, rig·ht to pursue 
happiness and safety, guaranteed to them by Article 1, Sec-
tions I, XI and XII of the Constitution of the State of Vir-
.ginia, and by Section I of the 14th Amendment to. the Consti-
tution of the United States, and abridges the privileges and 
immunities of the citizens of the United States, contrary to 
said 14th Amendment as well as to the provisions of the Con-
stitution of Virginia as aforesaid. 
FIFTH. 
The ordinance as construed and enforced constituted a 
-regulation of interstate commerce, contrary to the provisions 
of Clause 3 of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the 
·united States. and abridgment of the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States~ guaranteed under 
Section I of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of thP 
United States.,. 
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BACI{GROUND OF THE ORDINANCE AND POINTS TO 
BE ARGUED. 
The ordinanee here in question has its prototype in, and 
is generally known as the "Green River Ordinance". It was 
adopted originally by the Town of Green River, Wyoming, 
in a1most the identical terms of the present ordinance. 
The n1ost significant difference between the two being that 
while Section 1 of the Green River ordinance declared the 
practiee of going in and upon private. residences by solicitors, 
peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants, and transient vendor~ 
of merchandise, not having been requested, for· the purpose 
of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchan-
dise andjor for the purpose of disposing of, and/or for hawk-
ing the same, is declared "to be a nuisance". The ordinance in 
the instant case, 'vhile following its prototype substantially 
so alters it as to read as follows, (additions being shown in 
italies and exclusions within brackets): 
"The practice of being (g·oing) in and upon private resi-
dences by solicitors, (peddlers, * * * hawkers) itinerant mer-
chants, and transient vendors of merchandise, not having been 
requested * * * for the purpose of soliciting· orders for the 
sale of goods, wares and merchandise, (and) or for the pur-
pose of disposing of same (and/or peddling or hawking the 
same) is declared to be a nuisanee. '' 
The distinction betwP.en these two ordinances in thus pur-
posely eliminating "peddlers" and "hawkers" as such from . 
its inhibitions while including· only "itine·rant 1nerchants" 
and ''transient vendors of merchandise'' is significant of the 
purpose of the draftsman of the ordinance to permit sueh 
uninvited peddlers and ha;wkers, and all classes of merchants 
to carry as could escape classification as itinerant m,erchants 
or transient vendors of 1nerchOJndise, in none of which classi-
fications can it fairly be inferred, the draftsman intended to in-
clude resident merchants, resident peddlers or resident hawk-
ers of goods, having :fixed places of business (whether in 
vacant lots or not, as specified in Section 192 of the Tax sCode 
in classifying· merchants and peddlers, and in Section 188 of 
the Tax Code in reference to the license· tax on retail mer-
chants), thus, of itself, showing a purpose to make a.n ar-
bitrary classification not apparent in the original Green River 
ordinance as will hereafter be more particularly pointed out. 
Since its enactment in Green River this ordinance has 
spread over numerous towns and other small municipalities 
in various states of the Union, with but slight variations, 
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somewhat like the rush of boarding-school-boys after a hid-
den jam jar suddenly discovered by one of them.- -
The purpose of all of these ordinances are well open to 
question. Though it was sustained by the Supreme 
Court of Wyoming in Green River v. Bttnger; 58 Pac. 4561 
upon g·tounds distinguishable from the case at bar it has 
since, and notwithstanding, been condem.ried in various other 
states. The particular question has not lfe_en passed on here-
·tofore by this court, though the principles involved have been 
passed on in numerous cases by this co'til't, but which if ad-
hered to require its condemnation. 
The declared purpose of all is to prevent annoyance to 
householders, and to protect their right of privacy. The 
obviously practical·result is to protect local merchants from 
competition and from salesmen carrying samples of merchan ... 
dise io housewives and ~elling the same in interstate com-
merce, a pr-otection that is not secured by tequiring licenses 
of such salesmen even 'vhetP. a license tax is exacted of do-
mestic solicitors and merchants. Brenan v. Titusville~ 153 U. 
S. 289, 298, and Robins v. Shelby Cownty, 120 U. S. 489; 30 
L. Ed. 694, and a long line of decisions following them both 
cited and applied by tlris court in Adams v. Richmond, 98 Va. 
91, 96. -
It would be interesting if the record in this and like cases 
could show whether any genuine expression of the sentiment 
of householders was ever sought or whether they were en-
acted upon the urge of the local merchants. 
We believe it may be properly said, as a matter of common 
lmowledg·e that n1any and probably ~he large majority of 
housewives welcome the opportunity afforded by house demon-
strations and solicitations, and that it affords a convenient 
means of procuring· articles not usually available at local 
stores, and when regularly maintained it eases the house-
wives' shopping burdens. -
In City of Oran,qeburg v. Farnier, 186 S. E. 783, the South 
·Carolina Supreme Court noted that ''the ordinance was passed 
by the City Council * * * at the request of the Retail Mer-
chants' Association o£ that city, and not by reason of the 
complaint of householders·.'' -
, The record of that case also discloses that a survey made 
by a Federal Research Corporation upon a house to house 
solicitation in. that city, with answers from 250 housewives 
upon Questions as follows : 
"Q. Have any of these people (solicitors) hurt, injured, or 
annoyed you or any of your family, in any way? 
"A. N o.-242 or 96.8% ; yes~ or 3.2 %. 
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c 'Q. Was the conduct of these sales people invariably gentle .. 
manly and ladylike 7 
"A. Yes-248, or 99.2%. No.--2 or 8/lOth%. 
'' Q. Did you object to having anyone uninvited, call on you 
in your home to sell you merchandise Y · 
"A. No. 210 or 84%; Yes 40 or 16'%•" 
In the instant case there is no evidence. that any hottse-
keeper in any way rebuffed the petitioner. The admission o~ 
the stipulation of facts is that "he was never offensive, or 
unduly insistent'', nor· were ''any of his acts or practices 
dangerous, offensive, unhea:Ithy or unsafe, either as relating 
. to the general public or the person or persons upon whom· he 
called.'' 
The validity of such ordinance has been sought to be tested 
in various state and federal courts. One •Federal Court de-. 
nied jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance· ' 
on the grounds : 
''(a) That no property right was at issue in as much as 
the right of solicitors to call uninvited was not a property-
right. 
'' (b) That there was an adequate remedy at lawf and 
"(c) That equity was without jurisdiction to pre.vent the 
enforcement of a criminal statute." (Town of Green River 
v . . Fu~ler Bnu;h. Co·mpli'lty,_54 Fed. (2nd) 112, reversing the 
D1stnct Court 111 Fuller Bt·uch Company v. Town of Greet?J 
River, 60 Fed. (2nd), 613, which had held the ordinance in• 
valid and had enjoined its enforcement). 
It will_be observed that this opinion does not deal with the 
question of whether or not in a trial on the merits the actual 
conduct inhibited was shown to be in fa.ct a nuisance. 
The Supreme Court of Wyomifig also in an equity proceed-
ing, declined to enjoin the execution of the ordinance, again 
reversing the trial court, in Green River v. Bunget:, 58 Pac. 
(2nd), 456, supra, on the suggestion, apparently, that though 
the solicitation at a person's home without prior in\?ita.tion 
did not constitute a p'ltblic nuisance it "may invade the pro-
.prietor 's right or privacy, or may create a disturbance or 
constitute an annoyance under another special charter pro-
vision which the town had-a right to protect. The Supreme 
:Court of the UnitP-d States declined to review this case oft 
appeal on the gTound that no substantial federal question 
was presented. Bunger v. Green River) 300:U. S. 638; 81 L. 
Ed. 854. 
- This declination was not inconsistent with the co~clusion 
8 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Town of Green River v .. 
FuUer Brush Contpany, supra, 65 Fed. (2nd) 112, on the 
theory that the question 'vhether the conduct of the salesman 
in that case constituted a nuisance in fact under the special 
Wyoming statute, 'vas a question for determination by a trial 
court, and should have been determined by the tribunals of 
that State, on the facts of a particular case before appeal to 
a ·Federal Court, and was not a proper subject for equity 
.interference at that stage. That is also in harmony with the 
view of this court, expressed in JJ1ears v. Colo·rt·ial Beach, 166 
Va. 278, declining to enjoin violation of a town ordinance 
against a nuisance on the ground that even though such an 
ordinance declared a given state of facts a nuisance the de-
fendant was still P-ntitled to a trial and to show not only that 
the conditions alleg·ed did not exist but also, and even 
though they existed in fact that they did not constitute a 
' public nuisance in fact, and that the burden of proving this 
rested on thP. town unless it constituted a nuisance per se, 
and ·when the evidence failed to support the conclusion the 
court should so declare on appeal. Ca1npbell v. Con~n~., 167 
Va. 448. 
1\iiany other courts l1ave held such ordinances to be invalid 
-some on the ground that they violated the 14th Amendment 
to the F~deral Constitution-others that they violated similar 
rights preserved in Bills of Right or shnilar safeg\}ards of 
the respective state constitutions and others on the ground 
of lack of authority of a municipal authority under their 
charters or state statutes, or that they were on their face 
arbitrary and unreasonable, and did not constitute nuisances 
in fact, all of which apply here. 
The questions arising under the assignments of error will 
be argued under the follo,ving points : 
POINTS FOR ARGU~IENT. 
POINT 1. 
The business of soliciting orders at private residences has 
in fact been long recognized as harmless, useful, and for the 
mutual benefit of vendors and vendees, and as not constituting 
a nuisance per se, either public or private. 
POINT 2. 
The ordinance ·as construed : 
(a) _converts the orderly and useful prosecution of such 
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lawful business between private individuals on private prop-
erty into a crime. 
(b) makes a public nuisance of an act in no way public, 
nor affecting the public. 
(c) makes a private visit to a private residence a nuisance 
even though the owner not only has no objection thereto but 
may welcome it, may be greatly benefited by it. 
POINT 3. 
Unless the construction placed on the ordinance is· as in-
dicated in point 2 then there has been no violation of the or-
dinance either alleged or proven. 
POINT 4. 
The town was without valid legislative authority to enact 
or enforce the ordinance in any aspect applicable under the 
evidence, because: 
(a) The act inhibited was not a nuisance in fact, and could 
not be converted into one by fiat of the town council. 
(b) Only a public nuisance can be converted into a public 
offense, and a mere private annoyance cannot be so converted. 
(c) The ordinance as construed is contrary to the policy 
of the state as shown by state laws licensing peddlers, itinerant 
merchants and solicitors and others eng·aged in like business, 
or expressly exempting them from license fees. 
(d) The ordinance is arbitrary and discriminatory and con-
stitutes class legislation against a particular class of busi-
ness, with no just ground for the discrimination. Brennan 
v. City of Titusville, 38 L. Ed. 721. 
POINT 5. 
Such a grant of authority when exercised violates due pro-
cess clause of both the State and Federal Constitutions, above 
set out, and deprives vendors and vendees of property with-
out due process of law, and infringes the rights, liberties, 
privileges and immunities of citizens, guaranteed under each 
Constitution, to-wit: 
(a) The initial right of willing vendors and vendees to 
contact each other and contract to their mutual benefits with-
out undue interference. 
(b) The liberty of vendors to rely on an implied invitation 
of old customers as well as new, to present their wares. 
• j 
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(c) The liberty of owners to have solicitors call at their 
homes without express invitations in advance. 
POINT 6. 
As construed the ordinance constituted an unwarranted 
burden on interstate commerce contrary to Article 1, Clause 
3, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States. . 
., Brentnan v. Tit~tsville, 153 U. S. 289, 298; 38 L. Ed. 719, 
721. ,, 
ARGUMENT. 
"POINT 1. The busi-ness of solicitvng orders at private 
residences has been long recognized as harmless, use/'ltl, a;nd 
for the mutual be·nefit of vendors and vendees and not as con-
stituting a nuisa·n.ce per se, eithe·r public or private.'' 
This court might 'vell take judicial notice of the fact that 
direct selling, through uninvited calls at the home of pros-
pective buyers is one of the oldest methods of distribution 
known; that millions of dollars are invested in this method 
.of conducting business; that thousands of ·men and women 
earn their livelihood in this business to the mutual satisfac-
tion of all; and that literally millions of dollars of merchan-
dise is sold P.ach yP.ar in the United States by this method. 
This court might further take judicial notice of the fact that 
thP. mere calling at homes of prospective buyers is not in fact 
a nuisance, and that any inconvenience or annoyance to house-
holders cannot in reason bP. sufficient to constitute the prac-
tice a nuisance within any recognized definition thereof. The 
very fact that millions of people each year do purchase vast 
quantities of merchandise from direct house to house sales-
men proves conclusively that this method of merchandising 
is not only acceptable to but is also welcomed by the mass of 
individuals. 
The SuprP.me Court of ·Florida in the case of H. (Horace) 
Prior v . • 1. B.1White, etc., of the City of New Smyrna Beach 
(decided April 6, 1938), 180 So. Rep. 347, which case involved 
the validity of an ordinance very similar to the one under 
discussion, the court in· a very lengthy and able opinion dis-
cussP.s the ''Green River Ordinance'' and the Wyoming de-
- cisions thereon; the case of Jewell Tea Compamy v. Town of 
· Bel Air and othe1·s, 192 Atl. 417; the case of City of OrO!Jtge-
bur.Q v. Farrner, 186 S. E. 783, and used the following hin-
guag·e: 
J. H. White v. The Town of Culpeper. 11 
"It appears from the evidence in this case that the house 
to house soliciting of business such as was engaged in by 
this petitioner, constitutes what has become an ordinary, 
usual and lawful method of doing business, and our 
conclusion is that a municipality cannot, by an attempted 
exercise of its police power, prohibit such methods of doing 
business, except perhaps as to householders who have in some 
manner indicated that solicitation of business or certain 
designated types of business at their homes is not allowed." 
And cites long line of F'lorida cases. 
In the case In 're 'l'hornburg (Ohio) 9 (2nd) N. E. 516, de-
cided by the Ohio Court of Appeals on November 2, 1936, the 
validity of au ordinance which prohibited as a nuisance the 
distribution of handbills, cards,- etc., was declared to be in-
valid. The court in its opinion, after stating that the pho-
tographer who was handing out his cards was engaged ·in a 
lawful business, the right to conduct which was a property 
right which could not be abridged or destroyed under the 
guise of the police powers, further in its opinion used this 
language : - · 
'' * * * to declare the distribution of such advertising mat-
tAr, which is an incidP.nt of a lawful business, a nuisance as 
a matter of law an1ounts to an infringemenf of the constitu-
tional provision that a citizen shall not thereby unreasonably, 
arbitrarily or without clue procP.ss of law be deprived of his 
property.'' . 
''The legislative body of Cleveland cannot under the guise 
of the exercise of police powP.rs declare that a nuisance as' 
a matter of law which is not a nuisance as a matter of fact." 
The SupremA Court of South Carolina in City of Ot·ange-
bu.1·ll v. Ti'armer, 186 S. ·E. 783, dealing with a similar ordi-
nance said what is applicable in all respects to the instant 
case: 
"The ordinancP. declares that the mere soliciting of the 
sale of merchandisP. in and upon private residences is a nui-
sance. and levies a penalty upon such facts -shown. The 
penalty is not based upon the conduct of the salesman, nor 
is tb~ same based upon any valid shown reason of protect-
ing the public health, nor is any other fact required save 
and except an act which in itself is legitimate. (The appel-
lant show~d that thP. salesmen were almost without exception 
courteous and well-mannered, that numbers of persons de-
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sired this method of sale; that it was not a menace to public 
health, that large numbers of persons ov~r the United States 
made a livelihood in this fashion; that it was highly imprac-
ticable to sell certain useful articles by any other method; 
and on the whole there was no logical or valid reason for the 
ordinance in question. The ordinance 'vas passed by the city 
council of Orangeburg at the request of the Retail J\IIerchants 
Association of that city, and not by reason of the co1nplaint 
of householders; the matter of the passage and enforce-
ment of the ordinance does not appear to have been of import 
to the citizens generally of respondent, and when appelJant 
was arrested it was ~ot upon the c01nplaint of any citizen so 
far as the rP.cord discloses. The ordinance does not require 
a licP.nse, evidence of good character, a n1edical inspection of 
salesmen, or other safeg·uards which might protect the peo-
ple, but simply and boldly declares a lawful occupation .a 
nuisance. nieasured by the standards laid down in this court, 
the ordinance is unreasonable, unconstitutional on this ground, 
and void.'' 
"In legal phraseology the term 'nuisance' is applied to that 
class of wrongs that arise from the U'Jtreasonable, 'ltnwarraut-
able, or unlawhtl use by a person of his own property, real or 
personal, or from his own i1n1Jroper, i11,decent or unlawful 
pers0'111(1l conduct, working an obstruction or injury to a right 
of another, or of the public, and producing such m.aterial an-
noyance, inconvenience, discomfort or hurt that the law will 
presu11~e a consequent da,mage." 46 C .• J., pages 645-6. 
Since it is recognized that the right to engage in a lawful 
business is a mutual and reciprocal property right of bpth 
vendors and vendees, which carries with it the rig·ht of each 
to appeal to, or to be appealed to in proper manner 'vhich 
does not unduly infringe on the rights of others or the public, 
it becomes quite apparent that to declare the initial steps 
to such an appeal or presentation a nuisance as a matter of 
law amounts to an infring·ement of the constitutional right 
that the citizen shall not unreasonably, arbitrarily or 'vitlt-
out due process of law be deprived of his property or his 
liberties. 
"POINT 2. 
''The ordinance as construes : 
"(a) Converts the o-rderly and use/'ltl prosecution of suclt 
lawhtl b'ltsiness between private i1tdividuals on private prop-
erty into a crin~e. 
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''(b) JJ!Iakes a p·ublic n·uisance of a-n act in no wa.y p~tblic, 
nor aff ectin,q the p·ublic. 
'' (c) Makes a private visit to a private residence a n-wi..<:anoe 
even thou,qh the owner not only has no objection thereto b~ut 
may welcome it, and ~may be ,greatly benefited by it.'' 
vVe have shown, S~tpra, 'Point 1, that this is a lawful busi-
ness. Thnre is no evidence that the defendant was g·uilty of 
any unlawful, illegal, or even impolite or discourteous con-
duct in fact. On the contrary the only evidence bearing on 
this point is shown by the stipulated facts that he called 
upon listed cust01ners of said 1\:Iills in the Town o:f Culpeper, 
where such orders have been solicited for 1nore than fifteen 
years; and as he hears of new customers, likely to be inter-
ested, he calls upon them also; at times on approaching a 
customer or prospective purchaser he asks pern1ission to call 
later and present a small token, and if permission was given 
would later that day or probably the next day call, solicit the 
order and in some instances, especially as to old customers, 
would approach the customer, state the business and solicit 
orders without first asking permission to return and solicit 
an order. It furthP.r shows as a fact ''the defendant was at 
all timns courteous, gentlemanly and considerate in all his 
calls. was IleVP.r offensive or unduly insistent, nor were any 
of his acts or practices dangerous, offensive, unhealthy, or 
unsafe, either * * * to the general public or the person or 
persons upon whom the defendant called.'' 
Not only is there no P.vidence that his presence was dis-
tasteful. but under the law he had an implied invitation to 
be present, upon which he was entitled to rely until informed 
by the owner that his further presence was objectionable. 
Cooley on Torts, 4th Edition, Section 248, thus states the 
presumption in such instance: 
''So every man, by implication, invites others to come to 
his house as tlwy may have proper occasion, either on busi-
ness. of courtesy, for inforn1ation, etc. * * * Where the owner 
of land, with full knowled~:e of the facts, permits another 
repeatP.dly to do acts upon the land, a license to do such acts 
may bP. implied from his failure to object.'' 
.As above pointed out there is not the slightest implication 
in this case that any person called upon, rebuffed the defend-
ant, or that any such call could under any circu1nstances be 
constrnnd, either as a public or private annoyance, or was 
so regarded, but yet the ordinance brands that conduct a 
crime. 
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The fact that he had been calling- upon his old customers 
without objection for fifteen years ·would certainly, so far as 
they were concerned, amply justify the conclusion that he 
had a standing invitation to call at any convenient time. 
In like manner so far as he ''called upon listed customers'' 
it would be fair, in thP. absence of. evidence to the contrary, 
to presume that he had in fact or thought he had a prior im- ·) 
plied invitation to call upon such customers "where such l 
ordP.rs have been solicited for more than the past fifteen 
years'' without incident. 
The statP.ment of adn1ittP.d facts also warrants the conclu-
sion that even in the case of new customers, the object of his 
immediate call was to ascertain whether or not a subsequent 
call for the purpose of soliciting an order would be permitted. 
The source of his information of the likelihood of enlist-
ing new customers ''likely to be interested'', is not disclosed 
but there is nothing in thP. statement ·w'hich would justify an 
inference even that such calls were in any way distasteful to 
or ag·ainst the desire, express or implied, of these new custom-
ers. It would be just as fair to infer that he had received 
messag·es from such new custon1ers, or their neig-hbors, ad-
vising him that they would be interested in seeing him. (See 
par. 3 .agreed statement). 
The agreed fact is, that in. the case of new prospects his 
·custom was to ask permission to call later, present a small 
token or gift, and if permission 'v~s given would call later. 
It is submitted that in the absence of a rebuff followed by 
undue persistence therP.after, a solicitor had the right to 
assume that his continued presencP. is not contrary to the wish 
or desirP. of the owner, and as a matter of law, as well as ·of 
fact, he in such instances becomes an i'I'I!Vit ee ab initio, unless 
the householder under such circumstances macifests in some 
certain manner his wish to remain unsolicited; that under 
such circumstances a custom uniformly followed without in-
cident for fifteen years, would, as Mr. Cooley said in Section 
248, "determine in such cases what the limit is of the implied 
invitation''. · 
The following authorities are peculiarly applicable on this 
point: 
'' 'Invitation' * «= !it is a term of considerable breadth, and 
includes; not only express invitation, but the invitation that 
may be implied from custom, usage, or conduct on the part 
of the carrier, or of its servants." Lawrence v. Kaul Ltt'lnber 
Co., 55 So. 111 (Ala.) 
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premises in the ordinary way to transact business with the 
licensor, or that the objP.ct of his visit is one in which there is 
mutualitJJ of interest between licensor and licensee, then the 
permitted person ceases to be a mere licensee, and becomes 
not only a licensee, but an invited person." 1J1.uench v. Heine-
?nann, 96 N. W. 802 (Wis.) · 
''A license may be implied from the words and acts of the 
parties, .from the relation, 'vhether of blood or of business, 
which they sustain to,vards each other, from the exigencies 
of the case, and from custom and usage. Thus a license may 
bA implied wher.e one visits on business and is allowed to en-
ter or does enter without force." 37 C. J., 282. 
"Invitation of the owner or occupant is implied by law 
where the person goes on the premises for the benefit, real 
or supposed, of the o'vner or occupant, or in a matteJ: of 
mutual interest, or in thP. usual course of business, or for the 
performance of some duty. IJ1iddleton v. P. Banford Ross, 213 
Fed. 6-. (Fifth Circuit.) '' 
The doctrine on this subject is thus restated. in the ·Re-
statement of Torts (1934), Sec. 167 (d) : 
. ''The possessor's conduct, whether of act or omission, may 
constitute consr.~t. Thus the possessor's failure to object to 
a particular entry, or his acquiescence in similar entries on 
previous occasions may lead .the actor reasonably to believe 
that tllP. po~sessor is willing· that he shall enter * * *. Unless 
the possessor n1anifests otherwise a general or local custom 
may confer consent * * •. '' 
"Invitation by owner or occupant of premises is implied 
where one goes on the premises for the benefit, real or sup-
posed, of tl1P. owuP.r or occupant, or in matter of mutual in-
terest in usual course of business, or for the performance of 
some duty." Petree v. Davidson, etc., Co., 39 Ga. App. 490; 118 
S. E. 697, where the following definition from 17 R. C. L. 566, 
Section 791 was adopted: 
"The principle on which the courts distinguish a case of 
implied license from one of implied invitation, in the technical 
sense, seems to be this: Speaking g·enerally, where the privi-
leg~ of usP.r exists for the common interest or mutual advan-
tag-e of both parties, it will be held to be a case of invitation; 
but if it exists for the mere pleasure and benefit of the party 
exercising the pr.i v+lege it will be held to be a case of licens.e. '' 
• 
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Hundreds of other definitions could be cited drawing this 
distinction. 
The three conclusions on which this point is based appear-
to be self-evident as applied to the law and evidence in this 
case. 
''POINT 3. 
"Unless the consfntct·ion placed on the ordinance is as ind-i-
cated in Point f2 then there has been no violation of the ord'i-
nance.'' 
The petitioner does not wish his contention in this connec-
tion to be misunderstood. vV e are not desirous of raising 
any merely technical objection to the sufficiency of this 'var-
rant on any ground that could be cured by a1nendn1ent that 
could be supported by the evidence. We do point out that 
the statute itself as applied to the evidence, and the judgn1ent 
in this case, can only mean that the mere presence of a de-
fendant in the orderly and har1nless prosecution of a lawful 
business with private individuals on private property thought 
to be ''for· the comn1on interest and n1utual advantage of 
both", in the exercise of a reciprocal right, is converted into 
a public crime, and n1ade a public nuisance although such 
presencP. ·was in no way a public act, or an act ag-ainst the 
public, or affected the public, or could constitute a public 
nuisance; and that no other construction of the act is con-
sistent with the evidence, the charge and the evidence. 
What we have already said in connection with the discus-
. sion of Points 1 and 2 sufficiently establishes. \.\T~ think, this 
point. 
"POINT 4. The town was without valid legislative a.uthot·-
ity to enact or enfo·rce the ot·dinance in an.JJ aspect applicable 
unde1· tl~e evidence because: 
"(a) The act inhibited was not a n-ui.sance in fact, and cottld 
not be conve,rted i.nto one bJJ fi-at of the tou;rn; 
"(b) 0flily a publtic nuisa1we CltiJ~ be con.vertecl into an· of-
fense, a1~d a 1ne1·e private a'IWtOJJatlce ca~~tnot be so convet·ted; 
. '' (c) The m·dinance as constnted is contrat"JJ to the policy 
o.f the state as sho'lvn bJJ the state laws licensing peddle1·s, 
itiner(liUt nw1·chants, etc. a.nd others engaged in like business 
or expressly exempting thern fr(nn licen-se fees; 
" (d) The ordinance is a.rbit't·ctt·JJ, discri1ninatory a.nd con-
stitutes class le_q·islation against JJartic'ltlar classes of busi-
ness with no jtttst gt·ouncl for discri1nination. '' 
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'' (a) The act inhibited was not a 1z.uiswnce in fact, and could 
not be converted into one by fiat of the town.'' 
There are many definitions of what constitutes a "Nui-
sance". The elements constituting a nuisance are substan-
tially the same, ·whether the nuisance is public or private. 
The remedies therefore are fundan1entally different, how-
ever, dependent on whether they are public or private. The 
following definition of "Nuisance'' was adopted by this Court 
in Iierrin,q v. :1Vilto1b, 106 Va. 173, 7 L. R. A .. N. S. 349; 117 
Am. St. 997, from Ditt·man v. RetJP, 50 ~Id. 516, 33 Am. Rep. 
325, and reasserted by this court in Bragg v;. Ives, 149 Va. 
482, 499, as sufficiently broad to eover all aspects of nuisances : 
· ''In all such cases, the question is whether the nuisance 
con1plained of will or does produce such a -condition of things 
as, in the judg·ment of reasonable men, is naturally produc-
tive of actual physical discomfort to persons of ordinary 
sensibilities, and of ordinary tastes and habits, and as, in view 
of the circun1stances of the case, is unreasonable and in dero-
gation of the rig-hts of the eon1plainant. '' 
In B1·a.Q,Q v. lves, 149 Va. 482, 486, this court said: 
. 
''The law takes carP- that lawful and useful business shall 
not be put a stop to on account of every trifling or imaginary 
annoyance, such as n1ay offend the taste or disturb the nerves 
of a fastidious or 'ovPr-refined person." · 
And on page 497 said: 
"The decisions establish the term nuisance, in legal par-
lance extends to everything that endangers life or health, give~ 
offense to the senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs 
the reasonable and con1fortable use of property. B-ra.Qg v. 
lves, 149 Va. 482; 497; quoting frmn 20 R. C. L. page 380." 
If these conditions exist the result n1ay be a public nuisance 
or it may result in a private nuisance, or it 1nay result in 
both a public and a private nuisance, according to the fact 
of the act resulting in injury common to the public and to 
the public alone, in 'vhich event no private person has the 
right to abate unless the injury affects him peculiarly and in 
a vvay not comn1on to the public. If the injury is to the public 
a.lonP- no private person has a right to abate it, or complain 
of it alone. If the injury resulting from the act does not 
affect the public generally but affects an individual or various 
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individuals only in their individual ca,pacity then 1t is a pri· 
vate nuisance. It does not concern the public, and the indi-
vidual alone has the right or power to complain. 
The doctrine on this subject is thus stated in ~IcQuillan 
on Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3 (2nd) Edition, Section 
122: 
'·'Nuisance*** or annoyance, signifies anything that works 
hurt, inconveniencA or damage. A private nuisance is any-
thing done to the hurt or annoyance of lands, tenements or 
hereditaments of anothAr. A common or public nuisance af. 
fects the public. It is such an inconvenient or troublesome 
offense as annoys thA whole community, in general, and not 
merely some particular person. A private nuisance is a pri-
vate wrong done to an individual and must be redressed by 
privnte action. Such wrongs fall under the head of torts. 
Common or public nuisances are denominated public wrongs, 
and are classified as crhnes and misdemeanors, since the dam-
age rAsulting therefrom is com1non to the whole community, 
in ,2;eneral, no one being able to assign his particular portion 
of it. Laws in substancA define a nuisance to consist in un. 
lawfully doing an act or in omittlng to perform· a duty 'vhich 
either annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, health, re-
pose or safety of the citizen, or which unlawfully interferes 
with or tends to obstruct, or in any way render unsafe and 
insecure other persons in life or in the use of their property. 
Such commjssion or omission becon1es a public nuisance when 
it affects an entire comn1unity or any considerable number of 
persons.'' 
Dillon on 1\tiunicipal Corporations, Vol. 2-5th Edition, Sec-
tionS. thus states the same principles: 
''Nuisances are of two kinds-public or common nuisances, 
which affect people generally, and private nuisances which 
may be d~fined as anything done to the hurt of the lands, tene-
ments, or hereditaments of another. Russell on Crimes, 4th 
Ed. 435. * * * That which affects only three or four persons 
is a private and not a public nuisance. Kin.tJ v. Loyd, 4 Esq. 
220 * * *. 
''An indictment will lie for a public nuisance but not for a 
private nuisance. Kin,q v. Atkins, 3 Burr. 1806. That which 
is not of public concern is a mere civil injury. King v. Storr, 
3 Burr. 1698; J(ing v. Johnson, 1 Wils. 325; 46 C. J. 646, 
648." -
This rule was recognized by 1\{r. Justice Holmes in Penn. 
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Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 303, 67 L. Ed. 332. There a 
Pennsylvania statute forbidding the· mining of coal in such 
a way as to cause the subsi<le!lce of any dwelling place, even 
where the mining company had conveyed such dwelling place 
with a reservation by deed, for the right to remove all the 
coal thereunder, was sought to be enforced as a public nui-
sance. Mr. Justice Holmes said on this subject: 
''This is the case of a single private house. No doubt there 
is a public interest even in this, as there is in every purchase 
and sale, and in all that happens ·within the Commonwealth. 
Some existing rights may be modified even in such a case 
* * *. But usually in ordinary private affairs the public in-
terest does not warrant much ·of this kind of interference. 
A source of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance 
even if similar damage is inflicted on others in different 
places. The damage is 'lz.qt common or public.'' 
In 46 C. J., page 648, the limitations are thus stated: 
''The fact that a nuisance injures a great many persons 
does not make it a single public nuisance where the injury 
is to the individual property of each person and not to the 
general public as such. Inconvenience or annoyance to the 
public is an essential element without whiah there is no public 
or common nuisance. 
''A source of damage to a single private house is not a· 
public nuisance, even if similar damage is inflicted on others 
in different places the damage not being· common or public. 
45 c. J. 648. ,, 
vVith these distinctions in mind we look to the legislative 
authority, which is relied upon as authority for this ordi-
nance, bearing in mind that a municipal corporation has not 
inherent power, and must find statptory powers expressly 
g-ranted it, or necessarily implied, and as an incident to the 
exercise of powers expressly gTanted. 
In Rich'Ynond v. Lynch, 106 Va. 324, 326, this ~court said: 
'' 'It is' says Judge Dillon in his work on Municipal Cor-
porations (4th Ed. section 89) 'a general and undisputed 
proposition of law, that a 'municipal corporation possesses 
and can exercise the followin,q powers and no others : 
''First: those granted in express words ; 
''Second: thosP. necessarily or fairly implied in or incident 
to the powers expressly granted; 
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"Third: Those essential to the declared objects and pur-
poses of the corporation, not simply convenient, but indis-
pensable (italics supplied by the coutt). Any fair, reasonable 
doubt concerning· the existence of power is resolved by the 
courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.'' 
ThP. general statute (Va. Code Sect. 3080), contains the 
only general grant of power to all councils of cities and towns 
in this respect, in the following words: 
''Every city and town shall have power to prevent injury 
or annoyancP. from anything dangerous, offensive, or un-
healthy, and cause any nuisance to be abated." · 
The charter of the Town of Culpeper, as atnended by the 
Act of. l\{arch 24th, 19367 page 406, provides as follo,vs: 
''Section 3. The said town, and council thereof, shall in addi-
tion to the power herein and heretofore gTanted to it, and the 
duties herein and heretofore granted to it, and the duties 
herein and heretofore in1posed upon it, have all the rights 
and powers granted to towns under all provisions of the Code 
of Virginia * * *.'' 
· And section 29 provides : 
''The Council shall have po,ver within said town to lay 
off* * * and pave streets * * * and gutters for the public use 
• * * and have them kept in good order * * *; to prevent in-
jury or annoyance to the public or individuals from anything 
dangerous, offensive or unwholeson1e; to protect the places 
of divine worship and about the premises where held; to _ 
abate or cause to be abated anything which, in the opinion of 
a majority of the whole council, shall be a nuisance.'' 
It will be seen that tliere is no essential difference between 
the general powers granted under Sect.ion 3030, and re-
granted under Section 3 of the Charter, and those enu1nerated 
under Section 29, except that the latter are more specific, but 
all limited by the implicit purpose of all government protec-
tion from things dangerous and harmful and promotion of 
the g·eneral welfare. Indeed, Section 29, in dealing- with nui-
sanees, like _Sec. 3, g-ranting the general po,vers under Section 
3030, over the san1e follow the ,grant of g·eneral powers to pro-
tP.ct the public, and reiterate the g·eneral duties and powers 
to prevent injury or annoyance fron1 ''anything dangerouR, 
offensive, or unhealthy", and thereby liable to work "injury 
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or annoyance to the public or individuals because dangerous, 
offensive, or unwholeson1e to the public, and in order to carry 
out these purposes for the sake of clarity, and to avoid neces-
sity for relying on implication confers expressly what was 
already inferred "the power to abate or cause to be abated 
anything :within the scope of those tern1s, which in the opinion 
of a majority of the whole council is a nuisance, and thereby 
merely points as an appropriate means to the end of carry-
ing out the larger and urgent duty to prevent injury or an-
noyance not from anything the council may deem to be a 
nuisance, but '' fro1n anything dangerous, offensive and un-
wholesonle" in fact. 
It is respectfully subn1itted that the ordinance in question 
as construed in this case can find no warrant in either or all 
of the grants of power above recited. 
The general statute granting g·eneral powers only gives 
cities and towns· the power to prevent injury or annoyance 
from son1ething dangerous, offensive or unwholesome in fact, 
or contrary to the public welfare, and to cause any nuisance 
in fact to be abated, wbilP. Section 29 of the charter gave the 
town power to abate or cause to be abated anything dangerous, 
offensive or unwholeson1e in fact, something which in the 
opinion of a majority of the \vhole council was likely to be a 
nuisance. 
Council for the Town argued in the lower court, and will 
probably argue in this court, that these two provisions, either 
severally or in combination, grant to the Town Council power 
to declare anything actually existent, or anything , appre-
hendP.d as likely to occur in the future, to be a public nuisance, 
without reg·ard to the fact and even thoug-h in fact it is not a 
nuisance at all, and creates no annoyance to the public at all 
as such, and which may not P.Ven be offensive to any individual 
entitled to complain thereof, and that the council has the rigln 
to main~ all violations of such an ordinance a crhno punishable 
by fino or impris01nnent, even though confessedly the act and 
practices con1plained of were not either dangerous, offensive, 
unhealthy or unsafe, either in relation to the general public, 
or not even contrary to the desires of the owners of the prop-
ert}r 'vhose supposed right of })rivacy was being invaded. 
\Yith this contention we take direct issue. 
The g·encral grant under Virginia Code Section 3030 gives: 
"to prevent injury or annoyance fron1 anything dangerous, 
offensive or unhealthy and cause any nuisance to be abated." 
This is not a grant to declare an innocent and harmless 
occupation a nuisance. It is merely, as shown by the context, 
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a power to prevent injury or annoyance to the public from 
something, actually. or potentially dangerous, offensive, un-
healthy or otherwJse injurious to the public welfare, and to 
that P.nd to declare anything 'vhich is so a nuisance to be 
abated. It does not declare what shall constitute a nuisance, 
, beyond the age old definition repeated in the Act itself, any-
thing so dangerous, offensive, or unhealthy as to be naturally 
likely to cause annoyance or injury to the general public. 
No attempt has ever been made to define specifically what 
in fact constitutes or does not constitute a nuisance at com-
mon law or by statute. A given thing under some circum-
stances mig·ht constitute a nuisance, either public or private. 
UndP.r other circumstances the same act or thing might not 
do so. A definition of those elements, however, which do 
constitute a nuisance has long been recognized, Lorton v. 
Steele, 152 U. S. 133; 38 L. Ed. 385, and certain things have 
been so long recognized as uniformly fulfilling these defini-
tions under circun1stances prevalent in community life, that 
they are designated as nuisances per se, but even some of these 
are dP.pendent upon thP. location and effect with respect to 
the adjacent landowners and the public and the state of sci-
. ence-that what in one location or in one age or state of 
learning might be a nuisance per se would not be so in an-
other or vice versa; Milker v. New York, 190 N. Y. 481; 488; 
16 L. R. A. N. S. 621: WhaleJJ v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel, etc. Co., 
104 Ala. 216: 20 Ann. Cases 822; and J ere·my Imp. Co. v .. 
Como, 106 Va. 4R2, 492. 
This po,ver arises and is exP.rcised under what we call the 
police power. The UnitP.d States Supreme Court in Lorton 
v. Steele, 152 TT. S. 1R3: 38 L. Ed. R85, stated and defined the 
limits of its exercise by a state at page 388: 
· "To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in 
behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests 
of the general public, as distinguished from those of a par-
ticular class, require such interference ; and, second, that 
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment 
of the purpose, and not uriduly oppressive upon individuals. 
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the 
public interest arbitrarily interfere with private business, or 
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful oc-
cupations. In othP.r words, its deh~rmination as to what is 
a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, 
but is subject to the supervision of the courts. Thus an act 
requirinp; the master of a vessel arriving from a foreign port 
to report the name, birthplace, and occupation of every pas-
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passenger so reported, conditioned to indemnify the state_ 
against any expense for the support of the persons named 
for four years thereafter was held by this court to be inde-
fensible as an exercise of the police power, and to be void as 
interfering with the right of Congress to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations. Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U. S. 259. 
A similar statute of California, requiring a bond for certain 
classes of passengers described among which were 'lewd and 
dobauched '\ron1en~. was also held to show ve:tty clearly that 
the purpose was to extort money from a large class of pas· 
sengers, or to prevent their immigration to 1California alto-
gether, and was held to invade the right of Congress. Chy 
liu;ng v. Free1nwn, 92 U. S. 275. So in Hwrvrbibal v. Husen, 95 
U. S. 465, a statute of Missouri which prohibited the driving 
of Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle into the state between cer-
tain dates, in each year, was held to be in conflict with the 
commerce clause of the Constitution, and not a legitimate 
exercise of the police powers of the State, though it was ad-
mitted that the state mig}).t for its self-protection prevent 
persons or animals having contagious diseases from entering 
its territory. In Rockwell v. N earin_q, 35 N. Y. 302, an act of 
the legislature of New York which authorized the seizure and 
sale without judicial process of all animals found trespassing 
within private enclosures, was held to be obnoxious to the 
constitutional provision that no person should be deprived 
of his property without due process of law ( * * * Citing cases 
. * * .:,. ) . In all these cases the acts were held to be invalid as 
involvin~ an unnecessary invasion of the rights of property, 
and a practical inhibition of certain occupations harmless in 
thenu.;elves, and which might be carried on without detriment 
to the public interest.'' 
It is n1ani.fP.st that if a state cannot do these things it can-
not lightly he inferred it intended to delegate such a power 
to its Jnunicipality and still more that if it so intended its 
action in that regard is void. 
These principles are discussed .and a multitude of authori-
ties cited in the opinion of Sims, J., speaking for this Court in 
Bowman v. State Bntornolo_qist, 128 Va. 351, where in dis-
cussing the Cedar Rust Law and where at page 361 it is said 
of the police power : 
"It is universally conceded to include everything essential 
to the public safety, health and morals'' 
but not everything it may by" ipse dixit ~o declare. 
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The elasticity of the law is thus quoted from 6 R. C. L. at 
page 189. 
"The police power of the State never having been exactly 
defined or circun1scribecl by fixed limits, is considered as be-
in~; capable of development and modification within certain 
limits,-so that the powers of government control may be ade-
quate to meet changing social, econon1ic apd political concli-
tions. It is very broad and comprP.hensive and' is liberally 
understood and applied. The cha"i1ging· conditions of society 
n1ay make it imperative for the State to exercise add~tional 
powers, and the welfare of society may den1and that the State 
should assume such po·wers. '' 
At page 206 of the same authority it is said: 
''The police power extends -to the enactment of all such 
wholesome and reasonable laws, not in conflict with the con-
stitution of the State or the Unit<:~d States as they may deem 
conducive to the public good.'' 
Again at page 362 this court said, quoting from 1 Lewis on 
En1. Domain, Section 6: 
''Every property owner is bound to so use and enjoy his 
own as not to interfere with the general welfare of the com-
munity in ·which he lives. It is the enforcement of this duty. 
whieh pertains to the police power of the state so far as the 
exercise of ·that power affects private property.'' 
But the same opinion recognizes the limitations on this 
powet~ at page 368 : 
''It is trur., as said by the Supreme ~court in La1Vton v. 
Steele, sup'ra, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. Ed. 385: 'The legislature 
may not under the guise of protecting the public interest ar-
bitrarily interfere ·with private business or impose unusual 
and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In 
other words its determination as to what is a proper exercise 
of the police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject 
to the supervision of the courts'. As said in 1 Lewis on 
Em. Domain, Sec. 249: 'The Suprmne Court of the United 
States, which is the final arbiter upon these questions, says: 
'The validity of a police regulation, whether established di-
rectly by the State or by some public body acting under its 
sanction, n1ust depend upon the circumstances of each case 
and the character of the regulation, whether arbitrary or 
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reasonable, and whether really designed to accomplish a legiti-
mate public purpose * * *. If the n1eans ernployed have no 
real substantial relation to the public objects which govern-
ment may legally accomplish, if they are arbitrary and un-
reasonably beyond the necessities of the case, the judiciary 
will disregard mere fonns and interfere for the protection 
of rights injuriously affected by such illegal action' . '' 
Under the express provisions of the stipulation of facts in 
this case it appears affirmatively that the defendant 'vas "at 
all times courh~ous, gentlemanly and considerate in all of 
his calls. He was never offensive or unduly insistent, nor 
were any of his acts or practices dangerous, offensive, un-
healthy or unsafe, either as relating to the general public or 
the person or persons upon whmu the defendant called.'' 
'rhus expressly negativing any possibility of this statute l?c-
in~ sustained by any real or supposed legitimate considera-
tion of public welfare and leaving· it to stand starkly upon the 
mere ipse dixit of the To,\"'11 Council. 
The general grant was of ''power to cause any nuisance 
to be abated". This power extends only to a public nuisance. 
The definition of a private nuisance given by Pollock and 
approved by this court in V·irl}inia Ra·ilway Co. v. London, 
114 V a. 334, at page 344 is this : 
''A private nuisance is the using, or authorizing the use of,. 
one's property, or of anything under one's control, so as to 
injuriously affect the owner, or occupier of property (1) by 
din1inishing the value of that property; (2) by continuously 
interfering with his power of control or enjoyn1ent ·Of that 
property; (3) by causing material disturbance or annoyance 
to him in his use or occupation of that property." 
This court in H erri·ng v. W-ilton, 106 Va. 171, 173, discussing 
this point said : 
''The question is whetlwr the nuisance complained of 'vill, 
or does, produce such a condition of things, as, in the judg-
ment of reasonable n1en, is naturally productive of actual 
physical discon1fort to persons of ordinary sensibilities, and 
·of ordinar}r taste and habits, and as, in view of the circum-
stances of the case, is reasonable and in derogation of the 
rights of the con1plainant.'' 
A private nuisance as such is wholly a private affair, the 
right to abate it is purely a personal and private right and 
unless objectionable to the individual affected is the affair 
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of no one else, and the public can impose no duty to abate or 
deprive him of the·pleasure of continuing to enjoy it if he so 
pleases, provided, of course, it does· not become a public nui-
sance. This distinction of law and limitation on the public 
right is recognized in ·Cotno. v . . Webb, 6 Rand 726, and J et·emy 
l1np. Co. v. Convmonwealth, 106 Va. 482, 491. 
Dillon on 1\funicipal CoJ.]JOrations, Section 684, 5th Edition, 
in dealing with this power of municipal corporations over 
11uisances says : 
"It is to secure and promote the public health, safety and 
convenience that n1unicipal corporations are so generally and 
so liberally endowed with power to prevent and abate nui-
sances. This authority and its summary exercise may be 
constitutionally conferred on the incorporated place, and it 
authorizes its council to act against that 'vhich comes within 
the legal notion of a nuisance; but such power, conferred in 
general terms, cannot be taken to authorize the extra judicial 
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance, which, 
in its nature, situation or usP. is not such." 
He quotes frmn the opinion of the Supreme Court in the 
leading case of Yates v. Milwa'ltkee, 10 Wall. 497, as follows: 
"But the merP. declaration by the city council that a cer-
tain structure was an encroachment or obstruction did not 
make it so, nor could such declaration mal{e it a nuisance 
unless it in fact had that character. It is a doctrine not to 
be tolerated in this country that a municipal corporation 'with-
out any general laws ~either of. the city or of the state within 
'vhich a g·iven structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can, 
by the mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal 
by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or everi by the city 
itself. This would place every house, every business, and all 
the property in the city, at the uncontrolled will of the tem-
porary local authorities.'' 
Counsel for the town will doubtless contend here that in 
the instant case they are not without any general la'v to 
declare what is a nuisance, but that the town is endowed by 
special leg·islation with such power. 
Mr. Dillon deals with this question also in Section 690, where 
he says: 
"Under statutory authority conferred upon a municipal 
corporation to declare and to abate and remove nuisances, 
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of the power have, for some. purposes and in som:e jurisdic-
tions, been divided into three classes, First: those which in 
their nature are nuisances per se and are so denounced by 
the common law or by statute. Second, those acts and things 
including certain trades and occupations, such as slaughter 
houses, livery stables, laundries, soap and glue factories, 
which in their nature may fairly be regarded as tending to 
prejudice the public health and comfort, when carried on in 
populous centres, and about which, while impartial minds 
may differ, yet they may honestly be regarded as noxious and 
hurtful to the public interests, and as nuisances in fact. 
Third: Those which in their nature are not nuisances, but 
may become so by reason of their locality, surroundings, or 
the manner in which they may be maintained, managed, con-
ducted, etc.'' 
It is manifest that the third class here mentioned is the 
only one th~t could possibly apply to the c~se here in the 
lig·hf of the stipulated facts. 
Mr. Dillon then discusses the effect of municipal determina-
tion with respect to the first and second classes and as to 
the third says on pag·e 1046 : 
''As to the third class, i. e., acts and things not in any view 
of their nature nuisances pe·r se, but which may become so 
by reason of their locality and surroundings or the manner 
in which they may be kept, managed, or conducted, while they 
may be abated under the power conferred by statute, the 
proper construction of the power in respect to such things is, 
that the city has authority to declare by general ordinance 
what shall constitute a nuisance, that is to say, the city may 
by such ordinance define, classify, and enact what things or 
classes of things, and under what conditions and· circum-
stances such specified things shall be deemed nuisances.'' 
It is here to be noted that in the instant ordinance there is· 
no attempt to enact what things, or classes of things, and un-
der what conditions and circumstances solicitors shall be 
deemed a nuisance. The learned author continues: 
''As to the third class, it is for the courts to determine 
whether a nuisance exists in fact, and the city has no power 
of summary abatement or removal. In the determination of 
the question whether a particular act or thing constitutes a 
nuisance and should be abated, the local authorities, whose 
duty it is to compel the abatement, act in an admiwistrative 
and not in a judicial capacity, and are imder no obligation 
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to give the person who maintains the alleged nuisance notice 
of a hearing before making a determination, and may act on 
their own inspection or knowledge." 
And continues : 
''Any such detennination is not conclusive or finally bind-
ing on the courts. It is not entitled, in the absence of an ex-
press statutory provision to the contrary, to any greatet· 
presmnption of validity than the presun1ption of legality 
which attends the acts of all persons acting in an official ca-
pacity. And any person who, in abating a.n alleged nuisance, 
destroys or injut·es private property or interferes with private 
'ri.flhts, even if he be a public officer, save when he acts under 
the judgment or order of a court, having jurisdiction, acts at 
his peril, and will be held liable, unless it is sho\\rn when his 
act is challenged in court that the thing abated was in fact a 
nuisance.'' 
How ·it is possible for anyone reading the stipulation of 
facts in this case to conclude that the action of the defendant 
complained of in the warrant was in fact a nuisance either 
public or private is beyond imag·ination. 
The same lP.arned authority in note (1) to Section 690 deal-
big with the identical power here in question, pricks the town's 
possiblf~ contention as a bubble thus: 
"Under statutory authority to declare what shall consti-
tute a nuisance an ordinance declaring a partially burnt build-
ing to be a nuisance irrespective of its actual condition or 
location is invalid. The court declared the ordinance to b(~ 
invalid because it had no refP-rence or regard to the condition, 
character, situation, or surroundings which might tend to 
render the building unsafe in any manner to the public or a 
detriment to the health or convenience of the public.'' Evans-
ville v. Miller, 146 Ind. 613. Public picnics and open-air dances 
are not in their nature nuisances, and cannot be so declared 
by ordinance. If the manner in which they arc conducted be-
comes a nuisance, the ordinance should be directed the1;eto. 
Des Plaine.c; v. Pone,r, 12::l Ill. 348. Under power to pass or-
dinances to prevent and ren1ove nuisances a city has no right 
- to declare that a particular structure 01' business not con-
demned by any law or general ordinance is a nuisance nnd to 
have thP- structure removed or the business stopped or in-
terfered with. Lake v. Abe1·deen, 57 ~fiss. 260, 263. An or-
dinance adopted under power to remove nuisances, declaring 
to be nuisances buildings used for the storage of cotton seed, 
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while awaiting shipment, without regard to the manner in 
which the business is carried on, is ult·ra vires and void. Such 
a building is not per se a nuisance. Cuba v. i"Jilississippi Cot-
ton Oil Co., 150 Ala. 259; 43 So. Rep. 607." 
It will be seen that in cases of this kind in which a thing 
n1ay or may not be a nuisance according to the manner iu 
'vhich it is conducted, the legislative authority in that respect 
is not unlin1ited, and in all cases becomes a judicial question, 
and that in order for an ordinance to stand the judicial test 
it is necessary that the ordinance shall declare and provide 
what wrongful, hurtful or dangerous n1ethod of conducting 
such a business or enterprise shall constitute a nuisance. 
This is the very fault pointed out in the case of Oranpeburg 
v. Far'mer, 186 S. E. 783, supra, in which the court sa1d: 
"The occupation of soliciting orders from house to house 
is a lawful one when conducted in a proper n1anner. 
The ordinance does not attempt to differentiate between sales-
nlen who conduct then1selves properly and those who do not. 
The ordinance does not require a license, evidence of g·ood 
character, a n1edical inspection of sales1uen, or other safe-
guards 'vhich 1night protect the people, but simply and boldly 
declares a lawful occupation a nuisance.'' 
.And concludes: 
"1\ieasured by the standards laid clown in this court the 
ordinance is unreasonable, unconstitutional on this gTound 
and void. '' 
"The existence of a nuisance cannot be predicated solely 
upon violation of a n1unicipal ordinance 'vhen the act pro-
hibited is in itself indifferent and no duty exists apart from 
the ordinance. Field v. Gowcly, 199 l\1iss. 568; 19 L. R. A. 
N. S. 236, 239.'' 
The Court of Appeals of 1\{a.ryland in the case of Jewell 
Tea Cornpany v. Town of Bel Air, et a:Z., s~tzJra, 192 Atl. Rep. 
417, in which an ordinance of like nature involved was de~ared 
invalid, in its opinion nsecl the following language: 
''It is not pretended that it was passed pursuant to any 
special autho~·ity fron1 the legislature, nor can it be implied 
from any of Its charter po,vers." 
"We fail to see how tf1e solicitation or conduct of a legiti-
Inate lllfn·cantile business or trade can be resolved into a 
health, safety or general welfare regulation by suppression 
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by a town ordinance. It requires no discussion to convince one 
that the ordinance ( #74) regulating or forbidding the busi-
ness of the plaintiff has no relation to public health, safety, 
or the general welfare of the community. Span1t v. Ga;ither, 
152 1fd. 1; 136 A. 41; 50 .A. L. R. 620.'' 
(b) only a p'ltblic n'ltisance can be converted into _a qrirn-
inal off'ense, and a, n~ere private annoyance cannot be so con-
verted. 
The distinction between a public nuisance and a private 
nuisance, or rather lack of distinction between their elements, 
and that the real distinction is in extent and effect, and in 
the remedy and not the primary elements is thus stated in 
H an·is v. Poulton., 99 W. Va. 20, 29, 127 S. E. 647: 
"It is public because of the dang·er to the public. It is pri-
vate only because the individual, as distinguished from the 
public, has been or 1nay be injured. Public nuisances are in-
dictable. Private nuisances are actionable, either for their 
abatement, or for damages or both. vVhatever constitutes a 
public nuisance as to the public will constitute a private 
nuisance, if established so as to have the same effect 
upon the premises or health of a private person as it would 
have upon the public, if established in a city or highway.'' 
As heretofore stated the particular ordinance involved has 
not heretofore been presented to this court, but the underlying 
principles have been discussed in various cases and always 
'vith the sanw result. 
Yonng v. Co1nnwnwealth, 101 Va. 853, involved the anti-
- trading stamp statute of many years ago, and it was there 
held unconstitutional. It had its origin in the same motive 
which underlies this and similar ordinances, to-wit: The de-
sire to protect local tradesmen from outside competition. This 
Court said at page 862: 
''The word 'liberty' as used in the Constitution of the 
United States and the several States, has frequently been 
construed, and means more than mere freedom from restraint. 
It rheans not merely the right to go where one chooses, but to 
do such acts as he may judge best for his interest, not incon- · 
sistent with the equal rights of others ; that is, to follow such 
pursuits as may be best adapted to his faculties, and which 
will give him the highest enjoyment.'' 
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And again on page 863, in language equally applicable to 
the ordinance here in question: 
''The statute under which this prosecution was had under· 
. takes to prohibit and regulate and control the business of the 
defendant, and to prescribe penaltes for its violation. It is, 
therefore, both prohibitory and penal in its character. It 
has been repeatedly held that the only authority,,vhich a state 
_ or municipality has for enacting legislation of this character 
grows out of what is known as its 'police power'. 
''This has been generally defined to be that power which a 
State or municipality has to enact laws or ordinances whiqh 
pertain to the pttblic safety, the public health, or the public 
morals. The proposition above stated is so universally recog-
nized that it does not require the citation of authorities. It 
follows, therefore, that unless the statute in question is one 
which in some way provides for the pttblic safety, pertains. 
to the public health or concerns the pttblic 1norals, it is not a 
valid exercise of the police power.'' 
In the case at bar the agreed statement of facts shows that 
the conduct of this petitioner was in no way offensive, un-
healthy or unsafe, either as relating to the general public 
or the person or persons upon 'vhom the petitioner called. 
We thus find that the only ground upon which the validity 
of such an ordinance could be founded has been swept away. 
It is neither a public nor a private nuisance and if the latter 
it is not one of public concern. 
TJ1is court thus cites the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island hi State v. Dalton, 46 Atl. 234, 48 L. R. A. 725, 
84 Am. St. R18, and quoting therefrom said at page 864: 
"'We come then to the question whether the act before us 
is one which falls within the police power of the Legislature; 
for if it is not, it is clearly an unlawful interference with 
private right.' 
. ''The Court then proceeds by the process of elimination 
to demonstrate that the act does not look to, or in any man-
ner concern the pttblic health; nor look to or tend to promote 
the public safety, or in any manner relati~e to or tend to pro-
rn.ote pttblic 11w1·als. 
''The court says: 'In this connection it is pertinent to ob-
serve that it is not enough to warrant the state in prohibiting· 
a given business that it is conducted by methods which do 
not meet with general approval. There must be something 
in the methods employed which renders it injurious to the· pub-
lic in some one of the ways before mentioned in order to war-
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rant the State in interfering there,vith. Nor is it eno~tgh to 
bring a given business within the prohibitory power of the 
- State that it is so conducted as to seriously interfere with 
or even destroy the business of others. Take for illustration, 
the great deparhnent stores in our large cities. By reason 
of the almost infinite variety of goods which they carry they 
furnish greater facilities to custmners, and can offer thmn 
greater induc6meuts in the way of trade, than can those stores 
'vhich carry but a single line of goods. The result is, as every-
body knows, that very many sntall traders have been crushed · 
out, and obliged to abandon their business entirely while the 
owners of the nunn1noth establishn1ents, which supply almost 
everything we eat, drink, 'vear, use, need or desire, whether 
useful or ornmncntal, are prosperous and successful in a re-
n1arkable degree. But, while the result of this ntethod of do-
ing· business is injurious to those who en~ploy the n~ore tJri·mi-
t·ive one, can it be said that a. law prohibiting· a departincnt 
store would be a valid exercise of the police power 1 Clearly 
not. A case decided no longer than December last holds that 
such a la,v is invalid. \V e refer to the case of Chica.qo v. 
N etcher, 55 N. E. 707, 48 L. R. A. 261; 75 An1. St. Rep. H3, in 
which it was held that an ordinance prohibiting a person, firn1 
or corporation fron1 exposing for sale, or selling any meat, 
fish, butter, or other provisions in any place of business in the 
city where dry-goods, clothing or drugs· are sold t~nds in no 
way to protect the safety, health or morals of the public, or to 
accomplish an object falling within the police power. 
''It may be d01noralizing to legitin1ate business for two 
great rival dry-goods houses to cut prices in the atte1npt to 
undersell each other, or for two competing· railway lines to 
sell tickets at half-price in the attempt of each to get an ad-
vantage over the other; yet probably no one would claim that 
such competition could be prohibited by law. 'Bargain sales' 
and 'bargain counters' may be demoralizin~g to business, but 
probably no one would claim that they can be abolished by 
law.'' · 
It should be obvious that the danger of injury to individuals 
and to the public g·enerally, and the opportunity for petty 
crimes, is n1uch n1orc incident to bargain counter sales and 
even Christmas shopping· or circuses or fairs than can be 
said of house to house sample sales. As pointed out in "Des 
Pla·enos v. Pau.er, cited in Dillon Note 1, Sec. 690: 
''If it is the n1anner in which such solicitors 'are conducted 
constitute the nuisance' then the ordinance should have been 
directed thereto under the facts here admitted no exception 
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is possible to the manner in which this solicitor conducted his 
business.'' 
This court's discussion of the Dalton case, supra, con-
tinued: · 
''In discussing the question whether or not the transaction 
under consideration in State v. Dalton involved any element 
of lottery, the court says : 
'' 'The method of doing business which the act prohibits is 
the giving by a vendor, in connection with the sale by him of 
any article or articles, of any stan1p or other device, which 
shall entitle the vendee to obtain fron1 son1e other person 
some article of merchandise in addition to that actually 
sold. * * ·x. ' " 
'' ln other words, the act recognizes the right of a person 
to give away an article of n1erchandise in connection with and 
as an inducement to the making of a sale of some other article, 
but provides, in effect, that the giving of such article must be 
done by him directly, and not through a third person. \Ve 
fail to see that there is any substantial difference in principle 
between the two n1ethods, or that either bears any resmnblance 
to a lottery. The element of chance, which is the basal prin-
ciple in every scheme in the nature of a lottery, is wholly 
wanting." 
In the sa1ne sense this statute does not prohibit a resident 
n1erchant with a fixed place of business from calling upon 
citizens of the Town of Culpeper at their private places of 
residence and soliciting orders, but 1nerely prohibits the 
''practice of being in and upon private residences by solicitors, 
iUncra-nt merchants, and trG;nsien,t vendors of merchandise 
not having· been requested or invited so to do", and in itself 
constitutes a wholly unjustified discrimination ag·ainst the 
non-resident solicitor· in favor of a n1erchant 'vho cannot be 
classed as itinerant n1erchants and transient vendors. 
In Po'Well v. Bentley, 34 West \Ta. 804~ 12 S. E. 1085, 12 
L. R. A. 53, it was said: 
"To constitute a public nuisance the act done or duty 
omitted must affect injuriously son1e thing or right in which 
the co1nn1unity at large have a common interest.'' 
No authority can be cited holding that any municipal body 
has the power to indict for a public nuisance that which is 
only private. This point was expressly passed on by this 
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Court in Roanoke v. Bowling, 101 Va. 186, where quoting from 
15 Amer. and Eng. Enc. L. 1179, and authorities cited, this 
Court said : 
''The municipal authorities cannot arbitrarily declare a 
thing a nuisance, or destroy valuable property which was 
lawfully erected or created, 'v_hen such thing or property is 
not a nuisance per se, until this fact has been lawfully ascer-. 
taii1ed. Further, where the necessary power has been ear 
p-ressly conferred by the Legislature it is inope-rative and 
void, unless the thing is hi fact a nuisance.'' 
The necessity not only of the law but of the fact of nuisance 
being established in respect to such offenses being thus stated 
in 48 C. J ., pag·e 816 : 
''The general rules governing the construction of penal 
statutes apply in construing the statutes under consideration. 
They should be construed in the light of their pttrtJose and of 
the authority under which they are enacted.'' 
"And in Rex v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 23 Ont. L. 372, 
cited in 46 C. J. 816, Note 53, it is stated: 'It shall not be 
lawful for any pers_on or persons to engage in or carry on the 
.business of fat rendering, bone oiling, or the manufacture of 
fertilizers, or any business as a public nuisance' within the 
corporate limits of any city, or within three miles therefrom, 
did not intend to prohibit .the carrying on of the business of 
fat rendering in a city, irrespective of the 1nanner in which it 
was conducted, but only the carrying on of such business 'as a 
public nuisance', and therefore a judgment convicting defend-
ant of carrying on such business rendered under an indict-
nlent containing no allegation that he was conducting it as a 
public nuisance was erroneous.'' 
The distinction between public nuisances and private nui-
sances, and the applicable remedies, is sharply pointed out in 
Face v. Cherry, 117 Va. 41, where a bill was filed to enjoin a 
. nuisance as a private nuisance. The bill was demurred to on 
the ground that it sought to enjoin what in fact was a public 
nuisance. The court recognizing that if this was true and the 
nuisance was in fact only a public nuisance and not a private 
one that the demurrer should have been sustained, after citing 
the facts of the case said: 
''The first assignment of error is to the action of the court 
in overruling the demurrer to the bill. 
''This assignment proceeds upon the theory that the bill 
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seeks relief against a public nuisance and not a private 
nuisance, because of the allegation that the smoke, soot, etc., 
of which complaint is made affects plaintiff's dwelling and 
'other 11roperty in the twighborhood'. Plainly, the super-
added lang·uage does not have the effect of converting what 
is essentially a private nuisance into a public nuisance.'' 
"The foregoing statement of the law sufficiently shows that 
the nuisance in question is a private nuisance and not a pub· 
lie nuisance, and that the demurrer to the bill was without 
merit and rig·htly overruled.'' . 
''The constituents and definitions of a nuisance, whether 
public or private, are the same.'' 
In Powell v. Bentley, 34 West Va. 804, 12 S. E. 1025, 12 L. 
R. A. 53, it was said: 
"To constitute a public nuisance; the act done or duty 
omitted must affect injuriously some thing or right in which 
~he comrnu,nity at large have a common interest.'' 
The distinction between a public nuisance and a private 
nuisance therefore lies not in the act, or the quality of the 
act, or the purpose back of it, but in the remedy afforded the 
pergon or object injured the,reby ... 
If it is a public nuisance it is indictable as such and abat.-
able as such. If it is merely a private nuisance it is not in-
dictable, and not abatable as such even by a private person 
unless it. is a nuisance as to hi1n. The remedy in that case 
is an action by the private individual injured, who may either 
sue for the abatement of the nuisance or abate it himself, if 
he can do so peaceably, as in this case, merely by requesting 
a trespasser to remove, or by a suit for damages for the in-
jury done, or both, but there is no authority for indicting a 
person for a mere private nuisance unless it also constitutes 
a public nuisance, and in that case he would be liable both to 
indichuent and to a private suit for damages. But no authority 
can be cited under which any state or municipal authority has 
the power to indict as a public nuisance for that which is 
only a private nuisance, nor has any municipality the power 
to declare that to be a public nuisance which in fact is not. 
The points that the thing declared to be a nuisance must 
be in fact a public nuisance within the common law definition 
of that tern1, and that then the abatement cannot be carried 
beyond the necessities of the case, were expressly passed on in 
Bristol, etc., Co. v. Bristol, 97 Va. 304. 
There the council by ordinance declared a certain building 
to be a 11ublic nuisance, and directed the mayor to have it 
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abated a,s s'Uch. The owner engaged in a lawful business 
sought an injunction on the gTound that he ha_cl no notice that 
the matter of the nuisance was under consideration, that there 
'vas no legal evidence before the council that it was a nuisance 
and charged it was not a nuisance; that it in no way endangers 
the life or health of citizens and that its occupants are not 
disorderly or lewd and for no reason could the same be ac-
counted a public nu-'isa.nce. Appellee dmnurred and answered, 
citing its charter, power to require and con1pel the abaten1ent 
of all nuisances, as well as to prevent and regulate any dan-
gerous, offensive, or unhealthy business. The dmnurrer was 
overruled, but on the evidence the trial court refused the in-
junction, and distnissed the bill. The plaintiff appealed. l-Iar-
rison, J., speaking for the unanhnous court said page 306: 
"The bill states a clear case for the intervention of a court 
of equity, and the dmnurrer thereto was properly overruled.'' 
(Citing High on Injunctions, 187 4 Ed., pp. 463, 471; Y a.tes 
v. Milwa'Ukee, 10 "\Val. 497,) and continued pages 307-310: 
''The exercise of the police power is indispensable to the 
proper govenunent of all cities, and the safety and protec-
tion of the:ir citizens. The lin1it of that power it would be 
difficult to define, if indeed, it could be defined. There is no 
doubt, however, that it extends to the protection of the lives, 
health, morals and safety of all persons in the com1nunity. It 
is to secure and prmnote the p1l,blic health, safety_ and con-
venience that n1unicipal corporations are so generally and so 
liberally endowed with power to prevent and abate nuisances. 
This authority, and its sunnnary exercise, may be constitu-
tionally conferred on the incorporated place, and it author-
izes its council to act against that which con1es within the 
legal notion of a n~tisa.ncc; but such power conferred in gen-
eral terms c~nnot be taken to authorize the extra judicial con-
demnation and destruction of that as a nuisance 'vhich, in its 
nature, situation or use, is not such. 1 Dillon's lVIunic. Corp. 
(4th Ed.), Sec. 374; Yates v. City of Milwaukee, snpra. * * *" 
"In the case last cited, J\llr. Justice :Miller, speaking- upon 
this subject for the Supreme Court, says : 
" 'But the 1nere declaration by the citv council of ~Iii­
waukee that a certain structure w"as an encroachment or ob-
struction, did not 1uake it so, nor could such declaration make 
it a nuisance unless it in fact had that character. It is a 
doctrine not to be tolerated in this country, that a 1nunicipal 
corporation, without any general law, either of the city or of 
the state, within which a given structure can be shown to be 
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a nuisance, can, by its n1ere dec-laration that it is one, subject 
it to reinoval by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or 
even by the city itself. ~~ * * Numerous authorities of the high-
est value might be cited to sustain the law as laid down by this 
learned judge, but it is deen1ed unnecessary. 
''The question whether or not appellant's building is such 
a nuisance as called for its destruction, is one of the facts to 
be detenni·ned by the evidence. As already seen, the case stated 
by appellee in its answer, which is all it atte1npts to prove, 
is .that disorderly and le,vd persons are allowed to occupy 
the buildings; that they .are per1nitted to become filthy and un-
sightly objects, being· a constant source of annoyance to all 
parties residing in their vicinity, and that the value of the 
surrounding property is thereby depreciated. . 
'' ll ad these charg·es been establ·ished, the destruction of ap-
pellant's prOJJerty wottld not have been jttstified. "\Vhen a 
building_ is a nuisance only because of the uses to which it is 
devoted, the building itself cannot be pulled down to stop the 
nuisance, but only the wrongful use can be stopped. 2 vVood 
on Nuisances, Sec. 738. Indeed, it would require a great 
stretch of judicial power for a court of equity to sanction 
-the abaten1ent of a building as a nuisance, when the building 
itself does not, but only its use, constitutes the nuisance. The 
Ia,v will only permit the abatement of so n1uch of a nuisance 
as is necessary to prevent the injury. It is only necessary 
to be rid of the persons who use the buildings for an unlawful 
or hnproper purpose, and the la,v affords mnple reinedies, by 
indictn1ent and otherwise, to accon1plish this purpose. 
"In 1 Dillon :Municipal Corporations, Sec. 376, it is said: 
'Power to suppress bawdy houses gives the corporation au-
thority, by in1plication, to adopt by ordinance the proper 
means to accon1plish the end. But power to the common 
council of a city to n1akc all such by-laws as U ~ma.y dewm ex-
pedient for effectually preventing and suppressing houses , 
of ill fatne, does not authorize the council to decide that a 
g·iven house is kept for that purpose, nor if kept for that 
purpose, does it authorize the council to order it to be de-
molished, nor if thus demolished, will it justify the officers of 
the city who did it, in execution of the ordinance and resolu-
tion of the council.' In a case involving this question the 
Court of Appeals of New York said:' A house kept as a house 
of ill fatne, and as a resort for thieves and other disreputable 
persons, is a public and common nuisance, but the destruction 
of the building and its furniture is not necessary to its abate-
nlent, and is unlawful.' Ely 1r. StttJet·viso·rs of Nia,qara 
Connty, 36 N. Y. 297. 
"So when a building is not kept as clean as it should be 
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in the interest of public health, the remedy for this wrong·-
ful use is ample, and a destruction of the building for that 
reason would be unlawful. · 
''Nor can it justify the destruction of a building that its 
use diminished the value of surrounding property. It is not 
enough that it renders other property less saleable, or that it 
prevents one fron1 letting his premises for as large a rent as 
he might otherwise do, or to as responsible or respectable ten-
ants. Nor does the fact that a building is unsightly justify 
its destruction. 
''There are many unpleasant, and indeed, offensive things, 
that n1ust be borne with by the owners and occupants of es-
tates because, although offensive to the eye or cultivated taste, 
they do not trench upon any recognized legal right; and this is 
the case, even though the thing c01uplained of materially 
lessens the yalue of surrounding property. The home of the 
poor is often unsightly to the eye of those who are able to 
live in more elegant establishments, but to the humble occu-
pant, who can afford nothing· better, it is hon1e. 1 Wood on 
Nuisance, Sec. 3. "\Ve have thus far dealt with the case .of 
the appellee as stated in its answer." 
If the business of soliciting- is conducted by some in such 
an improper manner as to constitute ~ nuisance, that n1anner 
or method should be denounced as a nuisance, and not a 
method admitted to have none of the elen1ents of a nuisance. 
In the case at bar not only does the town declare a given 
lawful business to be a public nuisance without regard to 
any fact that would justify its being· so classified, but on tll(\ 
trial admits ''nor were any of his acts or practices danger-
ous or offensive, unhealtl1y or unsafe either as relating to the 
general public or the person or persons upon whon1 the de-
fendant called". 
That a thing declared to be a nuisance under a general au-
thority must conform to the common law definition thereof .is 
further illustrated in Standard Oil Co1npany v. Co1n1non-
'Wealth, 131 Va. 840, where at page 841 it is said: 
''The true test, as we understand it, may be thus expressed. 
The statute, to be valid, must, by its language, fairly con-
_strued and with reference to corn·mon law definitions (if the 
act denounced as a crime was punishable at common law) sup-
ply the standard by which the guilt of the accused person is 
to be determined. ' ' 
The principle here inyolved is thus declared in Mears v. 
Colonial Beach, 166 "\Ta. 278, where this court, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Eggleston, at page 281, said: 
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''The gist of the town's case, as made out by the evidence, 
is that the defendant's threatened acts are unlawful 'l'nerely· 
because they would violate a town ordinance; that the de-
fendant should be restrained from rebuilding a structure and 
conducting a business therein contrary to a town law which 
in express tenus provides a punishment for the things about. 
to be done. 
"(2) It is well settled that 'equity will not restrain an act 
merely because it is in violation of a tow-n ordinance', (Lan-
don v. Kwass, .123 Va. 544, 547, 96 S. E. 764, 765), or a crim-
inal statute (T~trner v. Hicks, 1()4 Va. 612, 615, 180 S. E. 543). 
See also 14 R. C. L., p. 376, Section 78; 32 C. J. pp. 275, 
276, Section 438; ~1cQuillan on 1\IIunicipal Corporations (2nd 
Eel.), Vol. 2, Section 852, p. 888. 
"(3) It is true that equity will enjoin the violation of a 
criminal law or a penal statute where the commission of the 
act will result in special and irreparable injury to property 
rig·hts. But this is not because of the criminal feature but in 
spite thereof. The criminality of the act gives no right to the 
injunction 14 R. C. L., p. 377, Section 79.'' 
''The distinction is well illustrated by two cases which ·have · 
been before this court. In Landon v. Ku;ass, 123 Va. 544, 96 
S. E. 764, we upheld the denial of an injunction sought to re-
strain the violation of a town ordinance regulating the type 
of building construction within a certain zone, where the evi-
dence failed to show any resulting special or irreparable dam-
age to complainant's property. While ~n Long's Ba,q,gage 
T1·ans!er Company v. Bu·rford, 144 Va. 339, 132 S. E. 355, an 
injunction was awarded to restrain the violation of a city or-
dinance regulating the operation of taxicab stands, where it 
appeared that the breach of the ordinance would have resulted 
in special datuages to property rights, difficult or impossible 
to ascertain. 
''To the same-effect, see Turner v. Hicks, 164 Va. 612, 180 
s. .FJ. 543. '' 
' ' ( 4, 5) Nor can the threatened acts and violation of the 
ordinance in the instant case be enjoined on the theory that 
they constitute a nuisance. They do not amount to such per 
se, and there is an entire lack of evidence showing then1 to be 
such in fact. In such cases 'Equity will not, at the suit of 
municipality, restrain violations of municipal penal ordi .. 
nances, if such violations do not amount to public nttisances, 
per se,_ but will leave the municipality to enforce its 1•emedy 
at law. * * * 40 A. L. R., p. 1170, Note : Olson v; Plattsville, 
213 "\Vis. 344, 251. N. W. 245, 91 A. ~. R. 308, ElizalJeth City 
v. Aydlett, 198 N. C. 595, 152 S. E. ·681." . 
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'' ( 6) vVhere the thing complained of is not a nuisance per 
se or pri1na facie, the burden is upon the plai'Jl.tiff' to show that 
it is a n·u·isance in fact.'' 46 C. J ., p. 787, Section 410; 20 R. 
C. L., p. 463, Section 79. This burden has not been sustained 
in the instant case.'' 
Ilere the town has been left to enforce its remedy at law, 
and the adn1itted facts show it not to be a nuisance. 
These are the exact facts there, and the facts stipulated 
show that on that trial no nuisance existed, or was perpe-
trated, and hence the town has not borne its burden to· show 
that it is a nuisance in fact. 
This point of the necessity of showing a nuisance in fact 
to exist is further illustrated by the still 1nore recent case of 
Carnpbell v. Co1no., 167 Va. 448. That case arose under an 
indictment under Sec. 55 of the Alocholic Beverage Control 
Act, which declared it a nlisdetneanor to n1aintain a "com-
mon nuisance'' which it defined as ''all houses where alco-
holic beverages H l'C n1anufactured, sto·red, sold, dispensed, 
given a.way or used contrary to law by any schen1e or device 
'vhatever' '. 
The jury convicted. On appeal this court reversed the 
case, and held that notwithstanding the discovery of liberal 
quantities of liquor and mnpty A. B. C. cartons that an un-
usual number of autmnobiles stopped in front of the house, 
that they had seen people g·o in and out and one witness tes-
tified that son1e of these people carried packages and that they 
constituted a nuisance to himself and fan1ily, on the ground 
the conviction was not warranted because the presence of the 
liquor and the surroundings were reasonably accounted for 
by the defendant's testbnony, corroborated by his wife; that 
he was fond of liquor "drank it freely" * * * frequently had 
guests to whom he served drinks, that he usually purchas~d 
* * * in quantities of one gallon •:i: * * that his supply on band 
was purchased at three distinct times •)(: * * that son1e of the 
containers found in the basement belonged to him and 
some he found there when he n1oyed in, that unusual noise, 
swearing or conunotion en1anating- from Campbell's house 
"had never been heard'' by three neighbors called as wit-
nesses for the Cmnmonwealth, and that they had never 1nade 
any con1plaint against the place. His explanation \Vas held 
"not without reasonableness and naturalness". The Court 
concluded (page 450) evidently on the theory that no nuisance 
"in fact'' was sho,'\111: 
"'¥ithout regard to the testin1ony of the accused and his 
witnesses, which to say the least was potent in refutation of 
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the· guilt of the accused, we are of the opinion that the evi-
dence is not sufficient to sustain the judgtnent of the trial 
court.'' · 
There is not a parti~le of evidence of a ''nuisance in fact'' 
in this case aside fron1 the ipse dixit of the to,vn counsel. 
Other ·authorities to the point that what is not a public 
nuisance in fact cannot be so converted by fiat of municipal 
authorities are· Daucly v. District of Col., -25 App. D. C. 434; 
Holden v. U. S., 25 App. D. C. 318. 
POINT 4. 
(c) The Ordinance as constr·ued ·is contrary to the policy of 
the State as show·n by the State laws licensing peddlers, itiner-
ant nwrchants, etc., and others enga,r}ed in like b'tt,siness or 
expressly exe,mpti·ng them, frO'Jn licens·e fees: 
Section 188 of the Tax Code, after defining a wholesale 
merchant, ''as every n1erchant who sells for resale only, or 
to institutional, con1mercial or industrial users'', and laying 
license taxes against then1 '' rrteasurecl by the an1ount of pur-
chases", during· the preceding· calendar year, defines "re-
. tail merchants", as "every merchant who sells at ~retail only 
and not for resale and lays a tax n10asured by the ''amount 
of sales throughout tho then next preceding calendar year", 
with a n1inirr1um of $10.00 on 1nerchants selling less than 
$1 ,000.00, $20.00 for less than $2,000.00 and 13 cents on every 
hundred dollars of sales in excess of $2,000.00. When he 
com1nences business during a calendar year he is required 
to estimate his expected sales "at the place at which he con-
du,cts his business", for the remainder of the year and pay 
thereon, with appropriate provisions for correction in e'\rent 
of underestimates, all to· be assessed by the Comn1issioner of 
Revenue for the County or City in which he located his place 
of business. It further requires every retail merchant to keep 
at each definite place of business the necessary records. This 
sec:tion contains a further provision that no additional li-
cense, state or local, ''shall be required of any person, firm 
or corporation, licensed as a n1erchant (wholesale or retail) 
i11 this state for engaging in the business of selling· goods, 
wares or merchandise by sa·m,ple where del,ivery is not 1nade 
at the tinw of sale, and where the goods, wares, or merchan-
dise subsequently delivered arc not the san~ples''. 
It will be seen at once that this business in which this de- , 
fendant was engaged contemplates all 1nercha.nts licensed by 
the State (wholesale or retail) as having "a definite and fixed 
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place of business '' from which sales are supposed to be made, 
and that aU merchants (wholesale and retail) are expressly 
exempted from all further tax or license impositions by rea-
son of conducting such a business as this defendant was con-
ducting. In other words he can conduct the identical busi-
ness of this defendant any,vhere in the State without further 
let or hindrance; a not unreasonable exemption in view of 
the· incapacity of the State to tax like sales in interstate 
commerce. See City of Petersburg v. Gen. Baking Co1npany, 
decided by this Court in April, 1938, 196 S. E. 59·7, not yet 
officially reported, wherein the corresponding provisions of 
Section 192 are construed as denying- to cities the power to 
tax contrary to the general state laws. 
This section is followed by Section 192 of the Tax Code 
which defines : -
''Any person who shall carry from place to place any g·oods, 
wa.res or 1nerchandise, and offer to sell or barter the sa·me, 
shall be deemed to be a peddler, and any person licensed as 
a peddler may sell any 1Jersonal property a merchant may 
Rell, or he n1ay exchange the same for other articles.'' 
And hence may solicit and sell by sample. 
''It further provides : 
''All persons who do not keep a regular place of business 
(whether it be a house or a vacant lot, or elsewhere), open 
. at all tin1es in reg-ular business hours and at the sa1ne place, 
who shall off e1· for sale goods, 'vares and merchandise, shall 
be dee1ned peddlers under this section. All persons 'vho keep 
a regular place of business, open at all tim.e.~ in regular busi-
ness hours and at the same place, who shall elsewhere than at 
such regular place of business, personally or through their 
agents, offer for sale or sell, and at the time of such o If ering 
for sale, deliver goods, wares and merchandise, shall also be 
deen~ed peddlers as above, but this section shall not apply 
to those who sell or offer for sale in person or by their em-
plovees, ice, wood, meats, milk, butter, eggs, poultry, fish, 
oysters, game, vegetables, fruit, or other family supplies of 
a perishable nature grown or produced by them and not. pur-
chased by them for sale. But a dairyman who uses upon the 
streets of arty city one or more wagons may sell and deliver 
from his wag·ons, milk, butter, cream and eggs in said city 
without procuring· a peddler's license.'' 
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From these definitions it is apparent that the legislative 
conception of ''peddlers'' as therein defined is different in 
important particulars from the vulgar conception thereof as 
"one who travels from house to house with goods to sell 
and deliver contemporaneously". There are at least four 
classes of tradesmen, contemplated by so much of this section 
as has been quoted verbatim as peddlers: 
• 
(1) Persons who carry from place to place any goods, wares 
or merchandise, and sell or offer to sell or barter the same 
or actually sell or barter the same. 
(2) Persons who keep no regular place of business (whether 
it be a house or a vacant lot or elsewhere), 'vho offer for sale, 
goods, wares . and merchandise. (This embraces all solici-
tors.) . 
( 3) All persons who keep a regular place of business * ~ • 
who else,where personally through their agents o If er for sale 
or sell and at the time of such offering for sale, deliver goods, 
wares and merchandise. 
( 4) A fourth class who sell or order for s~le certain spe-
cifically exentpt classifications of merchandise (1) ice, wood, 
meats, etc., of a perishable nature grown or produced by them 
and not purchased by them for resale. 
( 5) Dairymen who use upon the streets, one or more wagons 
may sell and deliver from their wagons the same character of 
perishable products even though not grown or purchased by 
them and even though purchased for resale. 
The same section contains still other and more complicated · 
provisions, placing license taxes on "peddlil~g or bartering", 
gTaduated by whether (1) the peddler travels on foot or oth-
erwise; (2) peddles ice, wood and other family supplies not 
grown or produced by them; (3) peddles seafood, purchased, 
directly from persons who catch the same, based on the num-
ber of '' vel1icles used in such peddling'' ; ( 4) peddles light-
ning rods, or ( 5) peddles coal or wood in cities of over 40,000 
fron1 vehicles. 
The section, 192, further empowers cities and to,,rns to 
designate "the streets or other public places on or in which" 
such licensed peddlers may sell or offer for sale their goods, 
wares or merchandise ; to ''classify peddlers'' and ''impose 
upon each class the same or different rates of tax except rio 
tax may be imposed directly or indirectly upon those ex-
em.pted fr01n a state license by this section". It a1so exempts 
from all of its provisions all peddlers covered by Sec. 192 (b) 
of the Tax Code which imposes a state license tax on all 
" * * * (other than a distributor and/or vendor _of motor ve~ 
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hicles, fuels-seafood, a farmer or farmers, co-operative as-
sociations, or a manufacturer taxable on capital by this state, 
or a distributor of 1nanufactured goods paying a state license 
tax on his purchases), who or which peddles goods, wares 
or merchandise by selling, and delivering the sa1ne at the 
sa1ne time to licensed d·ealers, at other than a definite place of 
business, operated by the seller", ·with a proviso that it "shall 
not apply to wholesale dealers rregulally licensed by the state 
and who shall at the sa·me tinte sell and deliver 'lnercha.'Julise 
to retail n1erchants ". ~ehese licenses are good all over the 
state. This sante section, 192 (b) of the Tax Code, again de-
fines a "peddler" within its "meaning" as any person who 
at other than a definite place of business, operated by the 
Reller, shall sell or offer to sell to licensed dealers or retailers 
and at the thue of such sale or exposure shall delive·r or offer 
to deliver tlu~ goods * * * to the buyer, and declares "any de-
livery 1nade on tile day of sale shall be construed as equiva-
lent to delivery at tin1e of sale". It further provides that 
anyone '' clahning exemption * * ':~< , on the ground he is de-
livering g·oods . * * * p·reviously sold * * * furnish evidence 
* * * other than his n1ere statement". 
These minute, intricate and technical prov1s1ons again 
manifest the frank legislative recognition of inability on the 
part of the state under Robbins v. Shelby, supra, and like rul-
ings to protect dmnestic n1anufacturers and local n1erchants 
frmn competition fron1 salesn1en engaged in interstate cmn-
merce as distinguished frmn others selling and delivering by 
licensing and taxing alone, and to avoid the resulting dis-
crimination against its own citizens by exempting· then1 frOin 
the state taxation they could lawfully impose but only to the 
extent necessary, and only when their employees or prin-
cipals pay a state tax as such on the capital engaged or volume 
of business, and then very properly '\ve think, in view of' its 
inability to tax foreign solicitors engaged in interstate conl-
merce, declined to impose any tax on ·soz.ic~itors of any kind 
as distinguished from tJeddlers, or merchants, and thereby un-
der the p,...rovisions of the act exempted all solicitors whether 
in interstate or intrastate commerce from a license under that 
section, and by the same sig·n banned any further local li-
cense on then1 "directly or indirectly". See Pet·e1·slnu·.q v. 
Gen. BaJcing Co., 196 S. E. 597, supra. 
· The town, however, relying on the prohibitive state ped-
dlers' tax of $250.00 to $500.00 in each county, supplemented by 
such local tax as it n1ight see fit to impose, under Section 192, 
as sufficient to i·usu1·e local n1erchants against both resident 
or non-resident peddlers, whether residents of the state or 
not, but being unwilling to. submit its local and fixed mer-
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chants to the same competition from other merchants licensed 
elsewhere by the state or ''exempted from taxation'' as en-
gaged in interstate commerce, sought by indirection and by 
declaring all uninvited solicitors, itinerant merchants and 
transient vendors, whether state or interstate, to be nu,isances, 
to protect its local nwrchants fr01n all non-local solicitors 
·whether intrastate or interstate, while at the same time pre-
serving to the local n1erchant the right to do the same kind 
and character of uninvited solicitation by confining its ban to 
"itine,rant'' and "transient'' vendors, omitting "peddlers'', 
and holding that local merchants with fixed places could not 
be classed as either itinerant or transient, solicitors, '' ped-
dlers and hawkers", but though as above shown the state 
statute defines all merchants with permanent places of busi- · 
ness, and who sell and deliver at the same time only, as 
peddlers, whereas, if they only offer but do not sell or deliver 
the . same day they are not peddlers and therefore free from 
all other license taxes under Sections 188 and 192. This method 
of protecting the town merchants from all competition of 
this character cannot escape the conden1nation of oeing both 
discriminatory and arbitrary, as well as unreasonable and 
COJ.Inter to the demonstrated policy of the State. 
The general doctrine on this subject is thus stated with 
a wealth of authority to support the same, in 43 C. J., page 
215, Section 219 : 
''Since a municipal corporation is a creature of the state, 
continuing its existence under the sovereign will and pleasure 
of the state, possessing such powers and such only as the state 
confers upon it, subject to addition or diminution ·of power 
at the state's supi·eme discretion, municipal regulations must 
not directly or indirectly contravene the general law, nor 
can such regulations be repugnant to the policy of the state 
as declared in general legislation. The power of the cor-
poration to exercise its police power over a particular sub-
ject matter ceases ''rhen the state acts upon the same subject 
matter, unless there is room for the exercise of concurrent 
jurisdiction. .A statute will override a conflicting municipal 
.ordinance, other things being equal, whether it precedes· or 
follows it in point of time. Ordinances which assume directly 
or indirectly to permit acts or occupations which the state 
prohibits, or to prohibit acts permitted hy the state, are uni-
formly declared to be null and void. J\1:unicipal regulations 
must not conflict with state laws licensing occupations or busi-
_nesses. .A. business or occupation licensed by the state may 
be regulated within reasonable limits, if th~ regu~ation does 
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not impair the right under the state license, but it cannot 
entirely prohibit such licensed business or occupation.'' 
An1011g other authorities cited to sustain this is Kirkha1n 
etc., v. Russell, 76 Va. 956, where after stating at page 961: 
"that in the construction of charters of corporations, whether 
public or private, it is a settled rule of interpretation, estab-
lished by repeated decisions of the highest courts in the land, 
that only such powers can be exercised under thmn as are 
clearly comprehended within the words of the charter, or de-
rived therefrmn by necessary implication, regard being had 
to the objects of the grant. And any doubt arising out of 
the terms used by the legislature 1nust be resolved in favor of 
the public.'' 
Continued on page 962: 
''In :mngland, says J ndge Dillon, the subjects upon 'vhich 
by-laws n1ay l)e n1ade were i1ot usually specified in the king's 
charter, and it became an established doctrine of the courts 
that every corporation had the in1plied or incidental right to 
pass by-laws; but this po,ver was accompanied with these 
lin1itations, nanwly: that every by-law n1ust be reasonable, 
not inconsistent with the charter of the corporation, nor with 
anv statute of pa r1imnent, nor with the general principles of 
the cmn1non law of the land, particularly those having rela-
tion to the liberty of the subject or the rights of private prop-
erty. In this country th~ courts have often affirmed the gen-
eral incidental power of 1nunicipal corporations to make or-
dinances, but have always declared that ordinances passed in 
virtue of the in1plied power must be reasonable, consonant 
with the g·eneral powers and purposes of the corporation, and 
not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the state." 
It is significant that a peddler or a hawker, is not eo nomi-
nee, banned from selling his goods, 'vares and merchandise 
under this ordinance in question here, even though his calls 
are unsolicited, and thoug·h the prototype ordinance is ex-
plicit on that point. 
The draftsmen of the ordinance were on thin ice in this 
respect and had to ·walk warily. If they follo,ved the proto-
t~1Je "Green River Ordinance", which banned eo no1ninee 
"peddler and hawkers", as 'vell as solicitors, "itinerant mer-
chants'' and ''transient vendors'' they would ban a busi-
ness activity recognized by state statute and declare that to 
be a nuisance which the state authorized eo no·mine·e as lawful 
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and licensed for n1oney, while if they banned all ''solicitors 
as such'' they would ban all solicitation at private residences 
by local merchants, as well as non-local. They evidently 
soug·ht to avoid any direct conflict on the face of the or-
dinance and statutes by ornitting any reference to ''peddlers 
and hawkers'', and leaving local n1erchants whom the state 
statute, Sec. 188, Tax Code, exen1pted fron1 tax as soJicitors 
and left the1n free to solicit such orders and only inhibited 
such activities bv ''itinerant 1nerchants and transient ven-
dors'~ • 
As the ban of the practice of being in and upon private resi-
dences is only against ''solicitors, itinerant merchants and 
transient vendors'' of rnerchandise, not invited, the class 1 
peddler, as above indicated, though manifestly au itinerant 
merchant, and a transient vendor of 1nerchandise, and as such 
subject to a state tax, is intentionally 0n1itted from the ban 
of this ordinance-doubtless because he is expressly licensable 
as such by the state, and as such entitled to sell anything a 
1nerchant may, but as owing· to the prohibitive license taJt of 
$250.00 to $500.00 to practice in each county, is actually non-
existent anyway and can be ignored, while the solicitor en-
g·aged in interstate con1n1erce can not be taxed at all and 
hence must be declared to be a nuisance whether or not. He is 
doubtless a nuisance to the retail merchants, and a pain in 
the neck as well, merely because he cannot be exc1uded by 
the excise tax while the peddler can be and is because the 
goods, \Vares and 1nerchandise the latter offers to sell, secure 
a. situs in the state when they are brought therein for subse-
quent sale. It is by such indirection that this ordinance un-
dertakes to prohibit interstate as well as non-local, intra~ 
state n1ercbants frmn doing· what a localn1erchant is permitted 
to do thereunder. 
It is also manifest that under the provisions of Section. 
192 it is conten1platecl that any person 1nay sell or offer for 
sale in person or by their employees "ice, wood, meats, milk, 
butter, eggs, poultry, fish, oysters, game, vegetables, fruit or 
other fan1ily supplies of a perishable nature, grown or pro .. 
duced by then1 and not purchased by them for sale, by solici-
tors from house to house whether they have been invited 
or not, and that a "dairyman who uses upon the streets of 
any city one or more wagons may likewise solicit as well as 
sell and deliver frmn his wagons milk, butter, cream and eggs 
in said city without procuring a peddler's license, and with-
out invitation.'' 
We subn1it that no good reason can be cited why the public 
interests, or private either for that matter, should be preju-
diced by a solicitor with no goods calling at private resi-
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dences without a previous invitation to sell his own products 
or those of his employer while neither the public nor the 
private interests will be affected by some other person call-
ing for t4e purpose of soliciting· the immediate sale of his 
goods, wares and merchandise, purchased from another, or 
manufactured, or why dealers in ice, wood, milk, butter, egg~, 
poultry, fish, oysters, game, vegetables, fruit or other family 
supplies of a perishable nature Inay call either with or with-
out his wares and cause no such injury or danger to the. pub-
lic or to individuals. 
This question of conflict between state policy and munici- . 
pal limitations thereon other than taxes, was presented in 
the case of City of BozeJnan v. JJtler·rell, 81 1\rlont. 19, 261 Pac. 
876, where the court said: 
''While Section 5039, authorizes the city to 'define' nui~ 
sauces, under the rule above that an ordinance cannot stand 
if it is in conflict with a stat~ statute, such authority means 
no ,uore than the city may declare in conformity with the 
statutes of the state what shall constitute a nuisance within 
the city limits. * * * 
"Nowhere in our statutes is an attempt made to declare 
the maintenance of a private nuisance a crime. The policy 
of the common law and of this state has ahvays been to leave 
private injuries and controversies to adjustment in civil ac-
tions, and to this policy, as well as to the positive statutory 
enactments, must an ordinance conform if it is to be upheld. 
2 McQuillan, ~Iunicipal Corporations 1423.'' 
In Evison v. Ry. Co1npany, 45 ~linn. 370, the ordinance lim-
ited the speed of railway trains, anywhere within the limits 
of St. Paul to four miles per hour, the court here, after recog-
nizing the unquestioned power of the city to adopt reason-
able regulations said: -
"It is self-evident that a limitation of the rate of speed 
might be reasonable in the thickly populated and cro\vded 
portions of a city.* * * which would be wholly unnecessary 
and unreasonable In the large tracts of sparsely-populated ter-
ritory of a merely rural character, now so often included 
within the corporate limits of cities * * * . To apply a uni- . 
form iron-clad rule to the whole of this territory, that no train 
Rl1all run over four miles an hour, is unnecessarily oppres-
sive.'' 
In Village of Golden· Valley v. lJilpls. N. db k~· Ry., 170 Minri. 
356, 212 N. W. 585, the court said : · · 
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"It is the rule that an ordinance may be declared void when 
from its inherent character or from competent proof, its op-
eration is shown to be unreasonable, unless the contrary ap-
pears from the text thereof, or is established by proper evi-
dence.'' 
POINT 4. 
(d) The Ord-inance is arbitra.ry and discriminatory and con-
stitutes class legislation against a tJa·rtic·ular class of busi-. 
ness, with no just gronnd for the d·iscrintination. 
What has already been said in conjunction with the preced-
ing Point 4 (c) sufficiently establishes this proposition and it 
will not be reargued. 
It is n1anifcst, we submit, that for each and all of the rea-
sons advanced in connection with this Point 4 that.the Town 
was without valid legislative authority to enact or enforce 
the ordinance in any aspect applicable under the admitted 
facts. 
POINT 5. S~tch grant of ct·uthority when exercised violated 
the d~te p'rocess cla·use of both the State and FecZeral Consti-
tu,tions, above set mtt, and deprives vendors ancl vMzdees of 
property w·itho·ut cl·uc process of law, and-infringed the rights, 
liberties, p1·ivileges and im,mttnities of citizens, guaranteed 
ttnder each Constitut-ion, to-wit : 
(a) The reciprocal rights of willing vendors and vendees 
to contact each other and contract for their mutual benefit 
without undue interference; 
(b) The liberty of owners to have willing solicitors to call 
at their homes without express invitations; 
(c) The 1nutual rights of willing vendors and vendees to 
neg·otiate contracts. 
It should not be n~cessary to argue the proposition that 
such a statute is an interference with the mutual and recipro-
cal rights, privileges, liberties and immunities of the citizens 
in the exercise of the ordinary daily transactions and inter-
course between thcn1 as citizens of a civilized state with re-
ciprocal rights and duties, guaranteed under Article 1, Sec-
tion 1 of the Constitution of Virginia, as well as under the 
14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution which prohibits 
the State from passing any law impairing these liberties. The 
Virginia Constitution, Article 1, Section 1, provides: 
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"That all1nen are by nature equally free and independent, 
and have certain inherent rights, of which, 'vhen they enter 
into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or 
divest their posterity, munely, the enjoy1nent of life and lib-
erty, with the nwans of acquiring· and possessing property, 
and pursuing and obtaining· happiness and safety.'' 
The right to n1ake contracts is both a liberty and a prop-
erty right, and is within the protection of the ·guarantees 
against the !aking of liberty or property without due process 
of law. Neither the State nor Federal Governn1ents, there-
fore n1ay interpose any arbitrary or unreasonable restraint 
.on ·the freedon1 to contract. This freedom, however, is not au 
absolute but a qualified one, and therefore subject to rea-
sonable restraint in the interest of public welfare. 12 C. J., 
Section 996, p. 1200, and eases cited. 
The public welfare is therefore the one ground upon which 
any restrictio11s of this kind 1nust rest. As already pointed 
out any such foundation is absolutely negatived in this case. 
(a) The 'reciprocal 1·-i,qhts of will-in,r; vendors and vendees to 
contact each other and contract for thei1· 1nut·ztal benefit with.,. 
ou-t undue interference. 
This right is a n1utual and re.ciprocal right. It takes two 
to make a bargain. A n1eeting of the 1ninds is essential to 
a contract. There can be no n1eeting of the n1inds without 
an offer and an ncceptance. Any lin1itation on the right of 
anyone to honestly represent his wares to another who is will-
ing to hear bin1 is a li1nitation of this reciprocal and 1nutual 
right and to that extent a destruction of this reciprocal right. 
''The right of a person to sell his labor upon such tern1s 
as he deems proper is, in its essence the same as the right of 
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which 
he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell.'' 
A(lair v. U. 8., 208 U. S. 161, 17 4; 52 ~- Ed. 436, ,442." 
It is manifest an offer to labor, or an offer to sell, or an 
offer to hire, or any offer to purchase, are conditions prece-
dent to the contract, and the forbiddance of such offers or the 
interposition of any obstacle between a willing· buyer and a 
willing seller, or between prospective buyer and seller en-
deavoring to ascertain if they can agree is an abridgment of 
this right, unless it is n1anifest that the public welfare will 
be unfavorably affected if such an atten1pt at agreement is 
perfected. 
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The Constitution guarantees include the priyilege of every 
citizen to select those tradesnten whom he desires to patron-
ize and equity cannot take away the right either directly or 
indirectly without due process of law, 12 C. J. 1200, Note 20, 
quoting New J.l!idland L. Contpany v. lJf.cCann, Cal. 161, Pac. 
990. 
This is a right which is useless if the right of ~he selected 
tradesman to trade is denied. It rmuinds me of the old jingle, 
'' Oh, n1other, n1ay I go out to swin1' Oh, yes, my darling 
daughter, hang your coat on a hickory limb, but don't go near 
the water''. In the instant case the housekeeper has the guar-
anteed right to select the tradesman who is ringing her door-
bell, but fron1 whom she cannot purchase if he rang without 
previous permission though the ringing is in effect his re-
quest for per1nission to enter, and the opening of the door 
and permitting him to enter is in effect the granting of such 
request, revokable it is true at any time at the instance of 
the housekeeper with or without cause or excuse. 
It is not contended that the vendor has the right against the 
wish, express or implied, of a prospective vendee to invade 
the property of the vendee, or even to so stop one on the 
street for the purpose of presenting his wares, but certainly 
under all rules of civilized life this right of privacy is a per-
sonal right, to be asserted :first, by the un\villing prospect 
before any right of the public could accrue to stop its further 
violation, and the right of the public could then only accrue 
upon the theory that its further assertion rrtight induce public 
disorder in a public place or a breach of the peace. It is mani-
fest that no such danger is no more inherent in submitting 
such an offer at the private residence than it would be if 
offered in a public place and yet in the one case it would un-
der this ordinance be a nuisance and in the other not, without 
regard to any of the other conditions. It is even more mani-
f<?Rt that such an offer 1nade to an unwilling vendee on a pub-
lic street would he 1nore apt to result in a public disturbance 
than if n1ade at one's hon1e, and yet under this ordinance the 
public offer on the public street would be lawful though re-
sented, and that n1ade at the private residence would be un-
lawful even though unresented. Surely, such classifications 
in crime can find no support in supposed public welfare. 
(b) The liberty of o~vn·ers to have willin,q solicitors to call 
a.t the·ir ho11zes without express invitations. 
This reciprocal right and the lack of power in the state to 
deprive both parties thereto on the idea that it is a matter 
---- -~--- ---- ----
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of public welfare is sufficiently discussed in Yee Gee v. City 
and County of San Francisco, 235 Fed. 757, 759. 
"The right to labor or earn one's .livelihood in any legiti-
nlate field of industry or business is a right of property, and 
any unlawful or unreasonable interference with or abridg-
ment of such right is an invasion thereof, and a restriction of 
the. liberty of the citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Lochner v. · N MV York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539. :r.• * * 
That the industry here involved is in its essential nature a 
perfectly harmless, legitimate and even necessary one, as 
viewed in its relation to our do1nestic and social economy, no 
question is or can be made * * * . If, therefore, the ordinance 
as a whole, or in either of the features attacked, be a con-
b·avention of plaintiff's rights under the Constitution, its en-
forcement as to hin1 in such obnoxious i·espect would in equal 
conten1plation constitute an unauthorized invasion of his 
property. * * * . 
''Is such a regulation within the rule of reason which must 
govern the courts in determining its validity? For that neither 
a municipality nor the Legislature of a state 1nay competently 
interfere under the guise of a police regulation with the lib-
erty of the citizen in the conduct of his business-legitimate 
and harmless in its essential character-beyond a point rea-
sonably required for the protection of the 1ntblic, is too thor-
oughly settled to call for an extended citation of authority 
in its support. * * * 
''Another principle involved in the exercise of the police 
power, which it is hardly necessary to state, is that a mere 
Jegislative declaration that a business or occupation, harm-
less and innocent in itself, is inin1ical to the public interest, 
either as a whole or as to some feature of its conduct, cannot 
make it so, unless by reason of surrounding conditions the 
declaration can be said to accord with the fact as based upon 
the con1mon observation and human experience. The legis-
lature cannot by its mere ipse. dixit make that a guilty thing 
which is intrinsically an innocent one. In other words, any 
attempt at police regulation which interferes with the incH-
vidual in the conduct of an innocent and leg·itima.te business 
must have an appreciable relation to some public evil justly 
to be apprehended, and be ,reasonably calculated to avoid 
such evil. Beyond that the legislature may not go.'' 
See, also: 
H u1nes v. City of Little Rock, 138 Feel. 929, 932. 
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''The freedom of labor is perhaps the most sacred of all 
those that are guaranteed by the national and state constitu-
tions. A man has the right to earn his livelihood and support 
his family by following any vocation not harmful to society. 
It is not sufficient that it may seem useless to the court. 
Things that are useless to one man are articles of prime ne-
cessity to another. To be within the legislative power to sup-
press, an occupation must be deleterious in its nature, or likely 
to become so, such as theaters, and public balls, which, with-
out police supervision, are apt to degenerate into indecency 
and riot. A large part of the pursuits of life and not of ap-
parent utility, do nothing· to secure food, shelter or clothing to 
mankind, yet they assist some in that pursuit of happiness, 
which the Declaration of Independence proclaims to be one 
of the inalienable rights of men .. · 
"~Ir. Justice Bradley, in Live Stock Association v. Crescent 
City Co1npany, 1 Abbott C. C. 398, 1naintains this right in 
language which has been repeated by courts and jurists until 
it has become almost a legal classic: 
"We may safely say that it is one of the privileges of every 
America1i citizen to adopt and follow such lawful industrial 
pursuits, not injurious to the community, as he may see it, 
without unreasonable regulation or n1olestation. These privi-
leges cannot be invaded without sapping the yery foundation 
of republican government. A republican governn1ent is not~ 
merely a govern1ent of the people, but it is ·a free govern-
nlent. · Without being free it is republician only in name, and 
not republican in truth, and any government which deprives 
its citizens of the right to engage in any lawful pursuit, sub-
ject only to reasonable restri~tions are reasonaply within the 
power of the government to Impose, is tyranniCal and unre-
publican.'' 
See also: 
"CitJJ of Chicago v. Shu)ts, 173 N. E. 276-277: 
"If, as contended by the city, the ordinance in question 
was authorized under the g·eneral police powers of the city, 
it would then remain to be seen whether the municipal au-
thot·ities have in this case reasonably exercised such power 
* • • the handing out on a public street, sidewalk or public 
place of a 'circular, dodger, handbills, pamphlet, card, -picture 
or any advertising matter of any kind whatsoever' is not, of 
itself, any offense. On the contrary, such practices, as a gen-
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cral rule are hannless incidents to our everyday life.'' 
. "Laws which attempt to regulate and restrain our con-
duct in n1atters of 1nere indifference, without any good end 
in view, are regulations destructive to liberty. Under our 
Constitution and systen1 of Government the object and aim 
are to leave the individual entirely 1naster of his own con-
duct, except where the public good requires some direction 
of restraint. 'x' *' * The ordinance is not a reasonable exercise 
of its police powers. Its strict enforcen1ent would unreason-
ably ha1nper persons in the conduct of their affairs.'' 
(c) The 1n~dual rights of willing vendors and vendees to 
ne,qotia.te contracts. 
The liberty of o·wners to have solicitors call at their homes 
without express invitations, the interdependence of the 
rights of both vendors and vendees, so that they in fact con-
stitute a rig·ht n1utually and reciprocally accruing to each 
so that its violation by the public authority as to one destroys 
it autOJnatica1ly as to the other is sufficiently set out in Sec-
tion ( n) of this Point 5. 
POINT 6. 
As constr-ued th c Ordinance constitutes an ?f.nwarranted 
lnt1·den on, intersta.te com.-me-rce contrary to ArUcle 1, Clause 
3, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States. 
In lVilk v. City of Bartow, 86 Fla. 186, 97 So. 307, the 
Florida Court had under consideration an ordinance impos-
ing a license tax on salesn1en of the Fuller Brush Company 
who were selling articles in the same n1anner as the petitioner. 
1~he Court held that the regulation of such sales was inter-
state commerce. 
The headnotes were by the court. \V e quote from them 
and the opinion as follows: 
''A municipality cannot by ordinance lawfully impose a 
burden upon interstate commerce." 
''The negotiation of sales of goods, which are in another 
state, for the purpose of introducing them in the state in 
which the negotiation is made is 'interstate con1n1erce'. Rob-
bins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 289, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 
30 L. Ed. 694. '' 
''While a tax on peddlers who sell and forthwith deliver 
J. H. vVhite ~· The Town of Culpeper. 5S 
goods is within the police power of the state a tax on one 
'vho travels and solicits order for goods to be shipped fr01n 
'vithout the state is a burden on interstate commerce and un-
constitutional. Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389, 33 Sup. 
Ct. 294, 57 L. Ed. 565.'' 
It will also appear self-evident that if the city cannot taa; 
it cannot prohibit by merely a calling of a useful, lawful and 
harn1less business a nuisance. The greater restriction can-
not be enforced where power to enforce the lesser is lacking. 
The same principle is illustrated by the case of Pictor,ial Re-
view Co. v. C,ity of Alexandria, Lottisiana, 46 Fed. 337, 339, 
'vhere a city ordinance made it unlawful to sell, take orders 
for sale, or offer to sell by canvassing fro1n house to house 
or on the streets ·:+ * * any article of merchandise, without 
having first obtained fro1n the J\IIayor a permit so to do. * * $ 
The court said : 
"There is no question but that the city has the right to 
protect its citizens from hnposition by persons who may 
violate its police regulations intended for the protection of 
property, n1orals, health, and safety, where the nature of the 
business is inherently dangerous, but it cannot, because of 
any supposed or real difficulty in controlling the personal 
conduct of indiv,idual agents, not necessary to their employM 
ment impose an unwarranted burden upon otherwise harm-
]e~s and legitin1ate traffic in interstate commerce. The com-
plainant is adrnittedly engaged in a business involving no 
elenwnt of danger, and restrictions of the kind embraced in 
this ordinance are a direct interference with that free and full 
flow of trade between citizens by the constitutional provision · 
intrusted to CongTess the exclusive power to regulate. If the 
city can require a per1nit, it may also iinpose a license fee 
of such n1agnitude as to be prohibitive. The requirement 
'vith respect to examination and the giving of bond, coupled 
with the power in the mayor with the rig·ht of appeal" to the 
council to deny altog·ether the rig·ht of anyone to act as agent 
of the c01nplainant, is an unreasonable restriction upon its 
business which affects directly interstate commerce.'' 
"Undoubtedly the state or municipality acting under state 
authority n1ay require the submission for personal examina-
tion of those agents of a foreign corporation carrying on its 
interstate business in the state where the nature of their 
duties is such as to require skill, training, or proper physical 
qualifications to enable them to perform the same with safety 
to the public, such as pilots, locomotive engineers, bus drivers, 
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etc. 12 c: J. 49, verba 'Commerce', Sec. 59, L. Ed., p. 64, 
Sec. 82. However, the business of plaintiff does not fail with-
in that class.'' 
A leading· case on this subject is Robbins v. Shelby, 120 
U. S. 489, 30 L. Ed. 694, where in denouncing the validity 
of a license tax: on travelling salesmen the court said: 
"In a word, it may be said, that in the matter of interstate 
comn1erce the United States are BUT ONE COUNTRY AND 
ARE AND J\!IUST BE SUBJECT TO ONE SYSTE1I OF 
REGULATIONS and NOT TO A ~IULTITUDE OF SYS-
TEMS. The doctrine of the freedom of that commerce, e~cept. 
as regulated by Congress, is so firmly established that it is un-
necessary to enlarge further upon the subject. 
''In view of these fundamental principles, which are to 
govern our decision, we may approach the question submitted -
to us in the present case, and inquire whether it is con1petent 
for a state to levy a tax or impose any other restriction 
upon the citizens or inhabitants of other states, for selling 
or seeking to sell their goods in such state before they are 
introduced therein. Do not such restrictions affect the very 
foundation of interstate trade? How is a n1anufacturer, or 
a merchant, of one state, to sell his goods in another state, 
without in some w·ay, obtaining orders therefor? 
''The only other way, and the one, perhaps, which most 
extensively prevails, is to obtain orders from persons resid-
ing or doing business in those other states. But how is the 
merchant or manufacturer to secure such orders? If he 
may be taxed by such states for doing so, 'vho shall limit the 
tax? It may amount to prohibition.'' 
We see in the present case the regulation has amounted to 
a prohibition in fact without a tax. 
·Ordinances substantially id~ntical here in question have 
been condemned and held void in the courts of other states 
because they have no reasonable relation to public health, 
Rafety or general welfare; Jewell Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air 
(Md.), 192 Atl. 27; City of 01·angebur,q v. Fann,er (S. C.), 
186 S. E. 783, 784. 
In conclusion on this phase of the question we quote the 
following from Cooley's Constitutional Lin1itations, 8th Ed., 
Vol. 2, page 1228 : 
''The result of the operation of the police power is natur-
ally in most instances, the abridgn1ent of private rights. 
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Private rights are never to be sacrificed to a greater extent 
than necessary'. Therefore the return for their sacrifice 
through the exercise of the police power should be the at-
tainment of some public object of sufficient necessity and 
importance to justly warrant the exertion of the power. * * * 
Since the right of trre citizen to use his property as he 
chooses, so long as he harms ·nobody is an inherent and con-
stitutional right, the po.lice power cannot be invoked for the 
abridgment of a particular use of private property, unless 
such use reasonably endangers or threatens the public health, 
safety, comfort or welfare. A law .which assumes to be a 
police regulation but deprives the citizen of the use of his 
property under the pretense of preserving the public health, 
safety, comfort or welfare, when it is manifest that such 
is not the real object and purpose of the r~gulation, will be 
set aside as a clear and direct invasion of the right of prop-
erty without any compensating advantages, citing Spoon v. 
Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513, 19 A. L. R. 1387." 
''The police power is not unlimited. Whenever it is in-
voked in aid of any purpose or legislation such purpose or 
legislation must bear some definite and tangible relation to 
the health, comfort, morals, welfare or safety of the public, 
citing Gold1na1t v. Crowthe'r, 147 1fd. 282, 128 ~tl. 50, 30 A. 
L. R. 1455. Miller v. Board of Pu,blic vVorlvs, 195 Cal. 455, 
234 Pac. 3817 38 A. L. R. 1479." 
CONCLUSION. 
The following are only a few of the innumerable cases which 
might be cited either involving ordinances similar to the one 
.here or the same principles and methods here in question 
wherein the contentions herebefore asserted have been sus-
tained. 
(Ark.) Hu·mes v. City of Little Rock, 138 Fed. 929. 
(Cal.) Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Richrnond, 298 
Fed. 126. 
Ex parte \Vhitewell, 98 Cal. 73. 
(Fla.) }fax~tvell v. llliarni., 87 Fla. 107, 33 A. L. R. 632. 
Inglis v. Rymer, 152 Southern 4, 5. 
(Ga.) Cosgrove v . .Aug~tsta City Council, 31 S. E. 4013. 
(Ill.) Chicago v. Shultz, 173 N. E. 276, 277. 
(La.) Pictorial Re1.1iew v. Alexander, La. 337, 339. 
(1\IIary.) Gold·ma·n v. Crowther, 147 }fd. 282, 38 A. L. R. 
1453. 
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Jewell Tea C01npany v. Town of Bel ..Ai1A, 192 Atl. 27. 
(Mich.) Ilorn v. People, 26 ~Iich. 221. 
People v . ..Ar·mstrong, 41 .N. W. 275, 276. 
(N. ·C.) State v. Ray, 131 N. C. 814, 69 L. R. A. 634. 
(N .• J.) Bragg1tglia v. Lord, 53 N. ·y. Law. 168. 
(Old.) In re: Webb, 1 Pac. 2, 416. I 
(Ohio) Olds v. Koltz, 3 N. E. 2, 371. 
(S. C.) 1Ylille1A v. City of G1·eenville, 132 S. E. 591, 592. 
(Tex.) Ex parte Smythe, 28 S. W. 2nd, 161, 162. _ 
Ilouston Ry. v. Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 84 S. W. 647, 653, 70 
L. R. A. 850. . 
Ray v. B·elton, 162 S. "\V. 1015. 
(U. S.) lVeaver v. Palnwr Bros., 270 U. S. 402. . 
D·uplex Printing P·ress Co. v. During, 254 U. S. 443. 
Fai1··mou.nt Co. v. Min.nesota, 274 U. S. 1, 71 L. Ed. 893. 
Le,qgett v. Ballbridge, 278 U. S. 105. 
Crenshaw v. Ark., 227 U. S. 3$9, 57 L. Ed. 565. 
PRAYER. 
For the reasons hereinabove stated and upon the authori-
ties cited, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
:Niarch 8th, 1938, above complained of, is erroneous and void 
and should be reversed and annulled. 
vVherefore, it is respectfully prayed that a :writ of error 
and supers·edeas may be granted in this case, and that this 
IIonorable Court may revie'v and reverse the action of said 
Circuit Court .of Culpeper County in adjudging your peti-
tioner tT. II. \Vhite g·uilty in violating the ordinance afore-
said. 
Counsel for petitioner desire to state orally the reasons 
why a writ of error and supersedeas should be granted and 
adopt this petition for a writ of error as their brief in 
this case. A copy of this petition has been delivered to B. 
~filler and E. E. Johnson, Counsel of record for the Town 
of Culpeper, this 1st day of July, 1938. 
Respec~fully submitted, 
J. H. WHITE, 
By Rr A. BICKERS, 
JOHN S. BARBOUR, 
Counsel for the Petitioner. 
The undersigned, R. A. Bickers and John S. Barbour, At-
torne~ys duly licensed and practicing in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of ·virginia, hereby certify that in their opinion 
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there is error in the final judgment complained of in the fore-
going petition, and that the same should be reviewed andre-
versed. 
R. A. BICKERS, 
JNO. S. BARBOUR. 
Service of a copy of the above petition acknowledged this 
1st day of July, 1938. 
BURNETT MILLER, . 
Counsel for the Town of Culpeper. 
Received 7/2/38. 
GEORGE L. BROWNING. 
Writ of error granted, supersedeas awarded. Bond $300.00. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS •. 
8/8/38. 
I 
Received Aus-. 11, 1938. 
M. B. W. 
-RECORD 
The following pages designated as two, three, four, five, 
six~ seven. ei~ht, nine and ten are a complete transcript of 
the record in the case of the Town of Culpeper v. J. H. White, 
in the Trial Justice Court of Culpeper County ~nd in the 
Circuit Court of Culpeper County, Virginia. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Culpeper. 
Town of Culpeper 
v. 
J. H. \\Thite 
page 2 ~ APPEAL V\7 ARRANT. 
On the 7th day of October, 1937, there was :filed in the 
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Clerk's Office of the ·above styled Court a Warrant of Arrest, 
in the following words : 
State of Virginia 
Town of Culpeper, to-wit: 
To any Police Officer of the said Town: 
WHEREAS, Ed Payne of the said Town, has this day 
made complaint and information on oath before me, E"rank 
P. Maguire, Trial Justice Clerk of the County of Culpeper, 
.that J. H. White in the said Town, did on the 23rd day of 
June,.1937, unlawfully solicit orders for n1erchandise in pri-
vate residences in the Town of ·Culpeper contrary to ordinance 
of the Town of Culpeper. 
THESE ARE, THEREFORE, To command you, in the 
nan1e of the Town of Culpeper, to apprehend and bring be-
fore The Trial Justice, or his Assistant, the body of the said 
J. H. White to answer the said complaint and to be further 
dealt with according to law. And you are also directed to 
sunnnon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . as witnesses. 
Given under my hand and seal this 23rd day of June, 1937. 
FRANI{ P. MAGUIRE, 
Trial Justice Clerk. (Seal) 
On the back of the Warrant the following endorsement a p-
pears: 
Executed this, the 23 day of June, 1937. 
ED PAYNE, Sergeant. 
' 
Upon the exan1ination .of the within charge, I find the ac-
cused Guilty and fix punishment at $25 fine and cost, and .... 
in jail. 
N otc: Costs $3.00. 
C. E. REAMS, JR., 
Trial Justice. 
page 3 } Appeal noted & allowed 8jl7 j37. 
C. E. R., JR. 
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Note: A further endorsement appears on the back of the 
Warrant as follows : 
On docket Tax 1.00 
Clk 4.00 
5.00 
Pd by H. B. & B. 
On October 18, 1937, the following Order was entered: 
This day came counsel for the Town of Culpeper and like-
wise counsel for the accused, and the accused, by counsel, in 
open court waived his right to a trial by jury, and with the 
consent of the attorneys for the town of Culpeper here en-
tered of record, all matters of law and fact were left to the 
court for its determination. 
And upon motion of counsel for the town of Culpeper for 
a trial of this case, said motion is granted, and tiie . case is 
set for trial on NovembP.r 19, 1937. 
On back of the Order the following endorsement appears : 
L 0 B 18 
p. 341 
Oct 18-'37 
And on November 19, 1937. the following Order was en- -
~red: -
This day came the attorney for the Town of 'Culpeper and 
likewise appeared the accused by counsel and tendered his 
p]ea of not guilty to the offense as charged in the said war-
rant, and waive«;] his right to a trial by jury; and with the 
consent of the attorney for the Town of Culpeper, all1na.tters 
of lnw and fact were l~ft to thP. court for its detern1ination. 
'Vhereupon the nu1iter having been submitted to the 
page 4 ~ court upon the agreed statement of facts and the 
Court having hearrl the argument of counsel, takes 
tinte to consider its judgment~ and this case is continued to 
the first day of the December Tern1 1937. 
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On the back of said Order the following endorsement ap-
pears: 
L 0 B 19 
p. 354 
Nov 19-'37 
And on !tiarch 8, 1938, the following Order was entered: 
This case having been appealed to this Court fron1 a judg-
ment of the Trial Justice Court entered on the 23rd of June, 
1937, imposing a fine of $25.00 and costs on the defendant 
for violation of an ordinance of the Town of Culpeper, which 
reads as follows : 
"Section 1. Tho practice of being in and upon private resi-
dences in the town of Culpeper, Virginia, by solicitors, 
itinerant n1ercha~1ts, and transient vendors of merchandise, 
not having· been requested or invited so to do by the owner 
or owners, or occupant or occupants of said private residences 
for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of g·oocls, 
wares, and merchandise or for the purpose of disposing of 
sarne, is hereby declared to be a ~uisance and punishable as 
such nuisance as a n1isdemeanor. 
. Section 2. The police officers of the Town of Culpeper are 
hereby required and directed to suppress the same and to 
abate any such nuisance as is described in the first section of 
this ordinance. 
Section 3. Any person convicted of perpetrating a nuisance 
as described and prohibited in the first Section of this or-
dinance, upon conviction thereof shall be fined a sum not less 
than Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) or more than One Hun-
dr~d Dollars ($100.00) together with costs." 
And by agreement of parties a jury was waived and all 
matters of law and fact 'vere submitted to the court for ad-
judication, and the case was heard before this court upon 
the warrant and the appeal from the judgment of conviction, 
and upon the agreed statement of facts as filed 'vith 
page 5 ~ the papers in the cause. 
And the Court being· of opinion, after consider-
ing 1:11e record. the agreed statmnent of facts, and hearing 
t11P. argument of counsel that the ordinance under 'vhich the 
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defendant was convicted is a valid and binding one, and a 
rea~~onablc exercise of the powers delegated to the -Town of 
Cu]JJcper by the Legislature of Virginia and not in contraven-
tion of constitutional statutP.s of the United States or of the 
State of Virginia; 
"'\Vherefore, it is considered by the Court that the defend-
ant J. I-I. vVhite be and he is llereby adjudged guilty as 
cl1arged in the warrant, and that he pay to the Town of Cul-
peper a fine of Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) and costs inci-
dent to this trial. 
To which ruling of the Court and its judgment on said 
findings the defendant by counsel excepted, and for his ex-
ceptions assigned the following g·rounds, to-wit: 
·First: That the Town of Culpeper, Virginia, is without 
statutory authority to enact the ordinance in question. 
Second : The enactment of the ordinance in question by 
the council of the Town of Culpeper, \Tirginia, was an unrea-
sonable and arbitrary exercise of tlw powers granted to it by 
the Leg-islature of the State of Virginia. 
Third: The ordinance in question is invalid on the gr({unds 
thnt it arbitrarily and without due process of law deprived 
the defendant of his liberty, property, pursuit of happiness, 
and safety, guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the 
lJnited States and the State of Virginia. 
Fourth: That the ordinance in question is invalicl on the 
grounds already set out, and further that the said ordinance 
cannot be enforced as to hin1 as he was and is engaged in in-
terstate commerce. 
And the defendant by counsel having announced 
page 6 ~ to the Court his intention to apply to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error to 
the foregoing judg·ment of the Court; it is by agreement of 
counsel ordered that execution on the for~g·oing judgment be 
suspendr.d until Jviay 7th, 1938. 
And it is agreed by the Court and so ordered that the ar-
rangP.Inent as to bail hP.retofore had, be and the same is con-
tinued until the final dP.termination of this case. 
On the back of. the above Order the following endorsement 
appears: 




L. 0. B. 19-p. 391 
1\'Iarch 8-1938 
Seen. R. A .. Bickers, Counsel for Defendant. 
TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENCE. 
Be it remembered that on ·the trial of this case on the 8th 
day of l\1:arch, 1938, a jury trial having Jleen waived and the 
case submitted to the Judge of the said Court upon an agreed 
statement of facts, which agreed statement of facts on ·be-
half of the plaintiff and of the defendant respectfully as here-
inafter denoted was all of the evidence that was introduced 
on the trial of this case, to-wit: 
First: The dP.fendant, J. H. White, is a solicitor for Real 
Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., an Illinois corporation, with its mills 
and executive offices located in_ the City of Indianapolis, In-
diana, and hereinafter referred to as Mills. The Mills is 
engaged in the manufacture and sale of hosiery, lingerie, and 
other similar merchandise. 
Second: The defendant has no stock of mer-
page 7 } chandise, but has samples which he displays to his 
customers. If a customer desires to place an order, 
he signs an order blank, which the defendant carries with 
him for such purposes. This order blank gives the name 
and address of the customer, the merchandise which he de-
sires, the sizes, ptices, amount paid down, and balance to be 
paid. Such signed order blank is sent to the 1\Hlls at In-
dianapolis for its approval and acceptance. If approved and 
accepted, the order is filled by merchandise sent direct from 
the Mills to the customer, parcel post, 1C. 0. D. If the order 
is not approved, accepted and filled, the down payment is re-
turned to the customer. 
Third: The defendant White called upon listed customers 
of said ~Iills in the Town of Culpeper, Virginia, where such 
orders have been solicited for more than the past fifteen years. 
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As l1e hears of new customers likely to be interested, he callt:~ 
upon them also.· 
Fourth: The defendant as solicitor of the Mills at times 
in approaching a customer, or prospective purchaser, at their 
private hon1e would ask permission to call later and present 
a small token or gift, and if permission was given would later 
that day or probably the next day call and solicit the order; 
and in some instances, which was especially true as to old 
customers, they would approach their customers, state their 
business and solicit orders without first asking permission to 
return and solicit an order. The defendant was at all times 
courteous, gentlemanly, and considerate in all of his calls. 
He was never offensive or unduly insistent, nor were any of 
his acts or practices dangerous, offensive, unhealthy, or un-
safe; either as relating to the general public or the person or 
persons upon whom the defendant called. 
Fifth: ~he Town of Culpeper is a Virginia municipality. 
On April 13, 1937, its Town Council enacted an ordinance, 
which was signed by the Mayor, and became effective on April 
27, 1937, which ordinance is as follows: 
page 8 ~ ''Be it ordained by the Council of the Town of 
Culpeper, Virginia: 
Section 1. The practice of being in and upon private resi-
dences in the town of Culpeper, Virginia, by solicitors, 
itinerant mP.rchants, and transient vendors of merGhandise, 
not having been requested or invited so to do by the owner 
or owners, or occupant or occupants of said private residences 
for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, 
wares, and merchandise or for the purpose of disposing of 
same, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and punishable as· 
such nuisance as a misdemeanor. 
Section 2. The police officers of the Town of Culpeper are 
hereby required and directed to suppress the same and to 
abate any such nuisance as is described in the first section of 
this ordinance. 
Section. Any person convicted of perpetrating a nuisance 
as described and prohibited in the first Section of this ordi-
nance, upon conviction thereof shall be fined a sum not less 
than Twenty-]'ive Dollars ($25.00) or more than One Hun-
dred Dollars ($100.00) together with costs. 
On call of roll the foregoing resolution was adopted by the 
follo~ng vote: 
--~--
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Aye-R. L. Arn1entrout, tT. B. Carpenter, .C. J\L Clemei)ts, 
Letcher Longerbeam, Giles H. ~filler, Jr., L. Frank Smith, 0. 
R. Thornhill, F. li. White, R. ~Iaxwell Willis; being all of the 
Council. 
No-none. 
On motion of 1Ir. ]\:filler duly seconded, it was ordered that 
, the foregoing ordinance be published for two consecutive 
weeks in one of the Town papers. 
Above ordinance passed on April 13, 1937 (being an ad-
journed meeting of the regular meeting of April 6, 193 7). 
Sixth: On June 23, 1937, the defendant, J. H. vVhite, a 
solicitor of the ~fills, was calling upon his custo1ners and 
prospective custo1ners in the manner as outlined in #4 above, 
and upon the orders of L. Frank Smith, ]\{ayor of the Town 
of Culpeper, to Ed Payne, a police officer of said Town, the 
warrant hereinafter set out was issued against defendant for 
violation of the town ordinance as set o:ut in #5 above; that 
the warrant was not based upon any complaint of any cus-
tomer called upon by defendant. 
Seventh: On said 23rd day of June, 1937, the defendant, 
J. H. vVhite, was placed under arrest by a policmnan of the 
Town of Culpeper, Virginia, upon a warrant sued 
page 9 ~ out of the Trial Justice Court of Culpeper County, 
'vliich warrant reads as follows: 
"State of Virginia 
Town of Culpeper: to-wit:· 
To any Police Officer of the said To,vn : 
'VHEREAS, Ed Payne of the said Town, has this day made 
complaint and information on oath before n1e, Frank P. 
l\1aguire, Trial Justice Clerk of the County of Culpeper, that 
J. H. vVhite in the said Town, did on the 23rd day of June, 
1937, unlawfully solicit orders for merchandise in private 
residences in the Town of Culpeper contrary to ordinance 
of the Town of ·Culpeper. 
THESE ARE, THEREFORE, To con1n1and you, in the 
name of the Town of Culpeper, to apprehend and bring be-
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fo1·e the Trial Justice, o rhis Assistant, the body of the said 
J. H. vVhite to answer the said complaint and to be further 
dealt with according to law. And you are also directed to 
summon .......................... as witnesses. 
Given under my hand and seal this 23rd day of June, 1937. 
FRAN!( P. ~IAGUIRE, 
Trial Justice (Seal) 
Clerk. 
Eighth: On the 17th day of August, 1937, said defendant 
was found guilty by said Trial Justice of the charge set forth 
in the foregoing warrant and fined $25.00 and costs of $3.00, 
and an appeal was properly prosecuted to the Circuit Court 
of Culpeper County, Virginia. 
All of which, on motion of the defendant is signed and 
sealed this 7th day of April, 1938, and made a part of the 
.TecOJ·d, and the Court doth certify that as to this certifica~e 
that E. E. Johnson and Burnett !!Iiller, Attorneys for the 
Town of Culpeper, Virginia, had reasonable notice of the 
presentation and the signing of this certificate. 
Given under 1ny hand and seal this 7th day of April, 1938. 
ALEXANDER T. BRO,VNING, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Cul-
peper County, Virginia. 
page 10 ~ On the back of the Transcript of Evidence, ap-
pears the following endorsement: 
·Received and filed April 7, 1938. 
C. T. GUINN, Clerk. 
State of Virginia 
County of Culpeper, to-"rit: 
I, C. T. Guinn, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Culpeper 
County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
correct copy of tl1e entire record in the case of Town of Cul-
peper 't?ers·u.s ,J. H. White. as the same appears on file and of 
record in my office, except such portions as are omitted as 
provided by law. 
And I do further certify that a notice of the intention of 
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the said J. H. White to apply for a transcript of the entire 
rP.cord in said case as above recited, was duly given to E. E. 
Johnson and Burnett ~filler, Attorneys for the Town of ~Cul­
peper. 
GivAn under my hand and seal of said Court, this 21 day of 
April, 1938. 
(Seal) 
C. T. GUINN, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cul-
peper, County, Virginia. 
Cost of copying and verifying record-$7.60. 
A Copy-Teste : 
-~L B. WATTS, C. C. 
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